Welcome to UTHR, Sri Lanka

This special report deals with a theatre of the current war about which little is known and little is understood. It is also a theatre in which the Sri Lankan state forces and the Tigers are following their instinctive chauvinism, without knowing where it will lead to. In Amparai District, the southern most of the three districts in the Eastern Province, three nationalisms — Sinhalese, Tamil and the incipient Muslim —are tragically proving the unrealisability of their respective claims. It is also a theatre in which the destructive politics presided over by the Sri Lankan state, where every edifying principle is cast aside for transitory tactical advantage, is very visibly shaking what is left of-civilised life in this country

After the brutal massacre of policemen by the LTTE and a call to join the final battle, the LTTE made a hasty retreat, putting the Tamil people in hot water. While the army and the other forces were being commended for their disciplined conduct by respectable circles in Colombo, anything from 3000 Tamils had been massacred in the Amparai District alone. These Tamils are amongst the most helpless and deprived people in the country, having now suffered a fate not dissimilar to what the Palestinian Arabs suffered in the late 40’s, with all its disturbing connotations. Their fate, as our evidence strongly suggests, is to do with dangerous implications of state ideology.

But the workings of state policy, a part of which is to work up Tamil—Muslim differences into murderous fervour, is itself turning an expression of Sinhalese strength in the chauvinist sense, into one of panic and weakness. Ridiculous manifestations of this policy are quite commonly in evidence. A young Sinhalese home guard with his shot gun, was one of a party assigned to protect our convoy through no man’s land. The lad who got into ‘our vehicle was a harmless looking village lad, smiling with shy respectfulness. His weapon was by far no match for those used by Tigers. Far from protecting us, he was making himself as well us ourselves targets. What was this government trying to do with these lads?

On the same day we met Sinhalese refugees in the Eastern Province — ordinary friendly human beings, happy to meet someone to whom they could talk in Tamil, a language almost as close to them as their mother tongue. What an impatient senior military official in the East said in connection with Sinhalese refugees from the East came to mind — “Tell me where they are, I will arrest them and bring them back’ What, arrest Deepani and her little ones and place them on no—man’s land or in a minefield? Are these people in their right minds? Such thinking is not isolated, and belongs to the natural workings of Sinhalese chauvinism. There was anger in official quarters towards Sinhalese who for basic human reasons had to flee their homes.

There is then the violence by Muslim elements which surfaces again and again during the course of this report. Upon closer examination it would appear that this violence is directly or indirectly at the behest of the state. Much anger as well as prejudice is now being directed against Muslims by both Tamils as well as Sinhalese. The latter too are now beginning to feel threatened.

These prejudices are being orchestrated by press reports, which speak of violence by Muslim home guards, while saying nothing about the state forces.

In order to make sure that we are not misunderstood as campaigning against a community, we shall place matters in perspective. There was in the first instance, the provocation of Muslims by the LTTE’s massacre of Muslim and Sinhalese policemen. The state actively directed this anger against Tamils and got Muslims involved in terrible violence against them. This was in turn followed by outrageous massacres of Muslims, particularly the ones at Kurukkalmadam, Kattankudy and Eravur in July and August. There are strong indications that the LTTE was responsible for the first two. The third is attributed to the LTTE mainly by circumstantial factors. But it is generally believed that the LTTE was responsible. See our reports 4 & 5]. According to official� figures, 700 Muslims had been killed. This was in turn followed by renewed use of Muslims in violence against Tamils. Sections of those Muslims who had long wanted to marginalize Tamil influence for economic and territorial motives became actively involved. Such motives again run counter to the agenda of Sinhalese Chauvinist- that is to make the East and particularly the Amparai District, Sinhalese. In the course of the state’s tactical manoeuvres amidst the complex motives of different interests, a state of anarchy has descended on the East. The activities of the state forces have become routinely criminal - from getting mixed up with and using petty criminal elements to crimes of a more calculated kind where young men are taken in several tens from refugee camps, never to appear again. During past bouts of violence, some kind of order has been restored in a matter of two weeks or so. How does one explain the anarchy in the Amparai District that has lasted� 4 months, where Tamils can neither move around nor are safe even in the Amparai District hospital. It must be kept in mind that LTTE presence in the district is minimal and there has been hardly any fighting here after the massacre of 11th June.

The current criminal violence by Muslim elements must not be seen as something integral to Muslim culture, but as a consequence of lawlessness resulting from an interaction between the long term aims of the state’s chauvinist ideology and the destructive politics of the LTTE. The anger resulting from the LTTE’s actions has given the initiative to influential sections in

the state machinery ,now manoeuvring tactically in the belief of taking advantage of the situation. To place this in context, take the exodus of Sinhalese from Jaffna after the 1983 racial violence. What happened to the Tamils in the South then showed the state at its diabolical worst, which it is trying to obscure today. But why did the Tamil leadership fail to speak up for the rights of the Sinhalese in Jaffna who were an integral part of local life? Were not life and the economy in Jaffna consequently impoverished? Were not Tamils in general happy to see the Sinhalese go, deprived of their livelihoods and property? We now know what the process has done to the Tamils.

Nor is there anything unique to Muslims regarding the provision� of lists� an�� information to the forces. Every party that exercised power in Jaffna had no difficulty, obtaining such things.

In the context of such politics, every inducement was given to motives of envy, revenge and criminal gain. The current war was not the first time that able and prominent Tamils were targeted for elimination. When civil servants Panchalingam and Ramanathan were killed in Jaffna last year, it was not Muslims or Sinhalese who were responsible. These and many other killings took place because base elements in Tamil society and the administration itself, were given an opportunity in the context of the prevailing politics. There have indeed been many cases in Jaffna where people have used militant groups to gain unfair advantage in settling land disputes, sometimes leading to murder by proxy.

While the LTTE is bound to prolong the paralysis in Tamil politics, is there no room for a Muslim leadership to assert some form of sanity? Is what is going on in the East really in the long term interests of Muslims? The progress of the Muslim community in this country owes much to its cosmopolitanism. Is it really the Muslim perception that their interests must be safeguarded by seeking disjointed cantons in the North—East? How will Sinhalese feelings be orchestrated when this same logic is applied outside the North—East to Puttalam, Beruwela, Galle and Hambantota? One could almost see deliberate pressure being exerted on the Muslims to prevent the Muslims and Tamils agreeing to a common political settlement. Sinhalese feelings on the whole issue are also being managed. They are being made to think that Tamils suffered in the East because of Muslims taking advantage of the situation — a view that is being given out by the forces and is finding expression in the press. Cynics are saying that the government may next use Tamil militant groups to teach the Muslims a lesson. Unless the Tamils and Muslims are alert, it is quite possible that the two groups which have every reason to get together as brothers, will be used to destroy each other.

It is thus important that every form of international pressure is exerted to put en end to the systematic violations of human rights that are an integral part of the government’s politics. At the same time this international effort should be alert to ensure that it does not play into the hands of destructive tendencies amongst Tamils that are being legitimised by the government.

The LTTE is now regimenting life in Jaffna in Goebbelsian fashion. Any form of independent thinking or expression is hounded out as treacherous. Detentions and executions have increased. Education, once held in high regard is now at a standstill. In consequence there has recently been a large exodus of students and intellectuals when the pass requirement was lifted for two days. Hardly anyone in Jaffna is even remotely thinking of the East. This politics will maintain the East and the rural North as a no man’s land, with an angry , deprived, and disinherited people producing children to be massacred or used as shields by the state forces, and in consequence a ready source of recruits for the LTTE. It is important that nothing is done to encourage or help this tendency. Tamils should instead be helped to combat it. This tendency is greatly legitimised by routine shelling, both aerial and land based, by government forces in Jaffna. On 9th October a helicopter fired shell killed about 10 persons in the Chavakachcheri market. The government and the LTTE are both interlocked into each other.

In questioning the stand and actions of the Sri Lankan state, one must also question the role of the Tamil intelligentsia that has one way or the other sustained the politics of the Tigers, with its capacity for wrecking every prospect of peace. The massacres of Muslims and Sinhalese destroyed even the possibility of human contact with people Tamils as well as the LTTE had to deal with placing everyone, including vulnerable families, in a whirlpool of brutality. When foreign journalists for instance, talk of Tigers still in control of most of the territory, it is only so in a destructive sense. It is not that they desire or even have the capacity to protect a single Tamil life. They thrive on provoking reprisals against Tamils. When the PFLT, the political wing of the LTTE, issues figures of Tamils killed in the Amparal District since 1983, their moral right and their motives in doing so must be questioned.

In trying to do some good in this situation, the absurdly hopeless position in which the LTTE has placed the Tamils must be clearly understood. The state is not a monolithic entity, but there is a dominant ideology determining its over all tendency. Nor is the state without its defences. It can say that it went to unusual lengths to reach accommodation with the Tigers. Over several months it had restrained its forces in the Lace of the Tigers humiliating and provoking them. It had even asked its policemen to surrender to the Tigers. What really happened was not so much the government ordering the forces to kill Tamils, but that a whole state and military apparatus steeped in chauvinism was suddenly faced with a problem for which it was not prepared. In challenging the state on what took place, we appear to be expecting more from the state than from the Tamil leadership that deliberately and knowingly placed the people in this position.

Because of the pressures on the state, both local and international, the state would, in many instances at least, like to minimise civilian casualties and instructions are given to officers. These officers also have simple assumptions based on their chauvinism. They may try up to a point. In dealing with an enemy so provocatively brutal and so callous about its own people, these officers quickly lose patience and conclude that it is right to kill Tamils.

In order to raise issues with the state and challenge particular injustices, there must be people who can organise and act independently. But the Tamils are completely stifled. While some independent views are allowed to appear in the southern press, those in Jaffna have no journals except the three Tamil papers appearing in Jaffna. These only publish the LTTE’s version of events.

While denying that the LTTE had killed Muslims anti—Muslim articles are published, leaving an impression that it is right to punish Muslims. So hopeless is the situation of Tamils under the LTTE, that they could hardly reach the state to challenge it. At a simple level, it is difficult to break through impressions and convince people that the state could have handled the problem differently and constructively.

Finally, we must express our appreciation to those persons and institutions who wish to remain unidentified, who not just helped us immensely, but without whose help the work on this report could not have been done. Many of them were Sinhalese. Some were so fluent in all three languages that it was hardly possible to guess their origins, nor was it important.. Their concern for the suffering people of the East was genuine. These are hopeful signs. While walking with some of them along a wide eastern beach, with the evening twilight and a lonely coconut grove to the west, we saw a sight symbolising the common tragedy that has overtaken many of our young, irrespective of communal boundaries. The tide had just brought in the severed head of a young lad. The small face was pink and disfigured, surrounded by a dense mop of black hair. It was a symbol of evil and also a challenge.

Note:Given the nature of prevailing situation we were unable to interview Muslims in the East. We are aware of the brutal alienation they were subject to. Despite the shortcoming, an effort has been made to maintain balance.

Addendum To the Preface

Remembering Rajani

The first anniversary of Dr. Rajani Thiranagama’s murder of 21st September 1989, fell at a time when the work on this report was being done in the Eastern Province. Her death coincided with the declaration of the ceasefire between the IPKF and the LTTE, which was hailed as ushering in an era of peace. A year later, we were amidst refugees in the East who had lost their belongings, many dear ones and were in .a state of utter despondency. It was under conditions prevailing under an earlier war between the IPKF and the LTTE in 1987, that we had vivid impressions of Rajani’s strength of character, vision and tremendous energy. She set about doing what she could, to mobilise the people to defend their interests and to make the university an, institution active in defending the people, and chartering a course for the future. One year after she was killed, the entire future of the Tamils has been plunged into uncertainty and gloom. The university has become a defunct institution. Rajani was despairing of the influential section of the intelligentsia, who by selling their names to rotten causes, save themselves, while endangeringeveryone else — particularly the ignorant and children, who are taken in by an air of respectability. The politics that created this degraded and uncared—for humanity in the East, did not spare Rajani who would have done something to wipe their tears. Feeling a sense of loss amidst all this suffering,) one could not help wishing for Rajani’s presence.

In the context of current hatred between Tamils and Muslims, Rajani had been very sensitive to the destructive potential of mishandled communal differences. She kept. a watchful eye on the well—being of students from minorities amongst Tamils — the Muslims, Eastern and the Hill—country Tamils. Whenever there were signs of one of them being victimised, she would warn other students, “If you behave in this manner towards them, you will one day find Jaffna isolated, losing its significance as a centre of culture and education”. Her fears have come close to Doing realities. It is well to recall what she had written in " the Broken Palmyra” on the Muslim Question:

“The development of the northern front occurred at the expense of many fundamental tasks of nation building. The blind spot in the concept of the Tamil nation was the question of two large sections of the Tamil speaking people — the Muslims or the Islamic Tamils and the hill country (plantation) Tamils. Tamil nationalism was the ideology of the Tamils of Sri Lanka. Historically, it had very tenuous links with the ideology of the Islamic or hill country Tamils of Sri Lanka.

The case of the Islamic Tamils spotlights the weakness of Tamil nationalism with clarity They are a grouping with a unique economic, socio—political structure, and cultural characteristics. Large sections of them live in the East, with pockets of them well entrenched all over Sri Lanka, but isolated from each other.. The cohesive factor binding them is Islam, not Tamil. Not only do they have historical contradictions specific to themselves with the Sinhalese, but have suffered during anti—Tamil “race riots” as well.

Though the slogans and programmes of all movements paid lip service to the rights of Muslims, there has never been a concrete programme to realise their goals, or the articulation of their needs and objectives during the process of the struggle. What has been proclaimed is a programme designed by the Tamils for the Muslims. There are immense contradictions and prejudices between Tamils and Muslims, which should have been handled during the years of struggle, a common basis built and an organic cohesion produced What we have is tokenism, some tenuous slogans a token presence of Muslims in the movements and the imposition of the hegemony of the Tamils (especially peninsula Tamils) which led to increasing contradictions. Therefore the advance of the Northern front was a facade. Internally, the inner core of the nation was cleaved, and many sections were inarticulate, isolated and in disarray. This situation was successfully used by the Sri Lankan government to increase the animosity between the Tamils and Muslims by even arming small groups of Muslim youths to escalate the conflict.”

In remembering Rajani, we take up at this point an important message she leaves behind for us as human rights activists. Given the destructive tendencies at work, Rajani was a strong advocate of the belief that the task facing human rights activity in this country was not to just document violations and issue statements, but also to build structures that will enhance and safeguard freedom. This involves a socio�political dimension. If one dissociates from responsibility in this matter, even the capacity for the former is quickly lost. It has happened in this country. Though the number of organisations in Colombo dealing with and studying human issues has multiplied, there is evidently little understanding or knowledge of what is happening in this small country — in the East for instance. There are many places where NGO’s have made little impact. Violations are so routine that people are unaware that there are such things as human rights. Whatever credibility the UTHR (Jaffna) commands today owes a great deal to Rajani. What structures did she have in mind? During the last few months preceding her death, Rajani was actively involved with the teething problems of Poorani� illam —a home for women in distress — which she helped to found. Apart from offering a home, Poorani� illam also aimed at imparting to these women a sense of purpose and dignity, and a will to combat any form of oppression. Happily, thanks to the dedication of Pat Ready and others, the institution has survived and gained in credibility through a difficult year. One of the speakers at the observance for Rajani on 12th October, suggested that it is because men have shirked and downgraded the labour of caring routine1y undertaken by women , that they far more readily become torturers and killers. The salvation of Tamil society today depends far more than ever, on the assertion of the dignity of women, and their having an important voice in determining our future. This was integral to Rajani’s vision.

Rajani had often said that if the UTHR (Jaffna) is to gain credibility and trust from the people, its members should be involved in the problems of ordinary people. It is because some members took this seriously that the organisation has survived. It is not an organisation that is well known in public, but it is known and trusted by several people who clearly see the present course of destruction, want to do something and can only do little. It may be more accurate to describe the UTHR (Jaffna), not as an organisation, but as a network of persons with diverse commitments who understand, trust and help each other. It is a structure of sorts, the best possible under a totalitarian dispensation. What the future holds depends crucially on external factors.

Chapter 1 THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT’ ‘S

OPERATIONS IN THE EAST

1.1The general pattern:

War was declared on the LTTE by the state following the LTTE’s atrocities against unarmed policemen on 11th June. The LTTE after saying that it would protect the civilians quickly withdrew from the major towns in the East as well as from the countryside in the Amparai District, almost without putting up a fight. Indeed there has been little fighting, but mainly a great deal of massacres of unarmed civilians by both sides. Both sides have directly or indirectly used civilians as shields. The LTTE was, as always, happy to fire from behind civilians and run away, while government forces have actually marched civilians in front, in a war of ambushes and mine—fields. Both sides have extolled the virtue and heroism of fighting men in song. But there has been no heroism, but only shame, venality and banditry. The shame is even greater on the part of those high up who used the fighting men as tools and a cover, for their own failings. The LTTE’s massacres of Muslim and Sinhalese civilians have been dealt with separately [UTHR (Jaffna), Report’s No.4 and 5].

On the part of the state, it has unleashed its tremendous destructive capacity, particularly in the East, in a campaign to uproot, beat down and render leaderless, the mass of the Tamil people. This has been done through a campaign of killing and terror. The elimination was more systematic when it came to persons in the community who were educated, in positions, graduates or in university ty arid were essential for the future.� leadership and protection tion of the community.

The survivors were driven away, their homes burnt and their goods methodically looted.
Muslims turned out to be convenient scapegoats. The story was the same everywhere, particularly in the Ampara District. Pottuvil� Kalinunai Akkaraipattu, Veeramunai, Karitivu, it was all the same. Muslims either provided lists or identified people� for elimination. When complaints were made, from the Minister of Defence downwards, the blame was casually placed on Muslims fanatics

The pattern of making refugees flee was again the same in places with large Muslim population nearby. When the Sri Lankan forces moved in during June, people were killed in large numbers, picked up on the basis of lists supplied and most were driven to refugee camps. One way of making refugees flee was to shoot those who moved on the roads in search of food or to regularly harass them by picking up young men from camps, who then vanished. This was the case in Pottuvil. In Veeramunai. and Sorikalmunali which are close to Samanthurai, people stayed despite such harassment. Immediately following the massacre of Muslims in Eravur on 12th August, Muslim hoodlums and homeguards were set up to attack the Tamils in the Veeramunai Piilayar Kovil refugee camp with knives and shotguns at 9.00 a.m. Witnesses saw the police watching from about 300—500 yards away. After about an hour, the STF arrived to call a halt. The STF and police were both about 11/4 miles from the refugee camp, well within hearing distance. The STF offered to escort the people to Thirukkovil, which they accepted. Vehicles were sent. Some vehicles took the refugees to Thirukkovil, while others carried a good part of their goods, including colour television sets, video decks, other electrical items and bicycles to Amparai and the South. Almost the same pattern was repeated in Sorikalmunai a month later. Tamils have thus been driven from many areas in the East. Particularly in the Amparai district, homes of Tamils driven away have been often burnt or demolished, making it difficult for them to return. That their displacement was meant to be permanent can be gathered from discrepancies in the manner in which security forces behaved towards Muslims and Tamils.

In the case of Muslims, the forces have gone out of the way not just to protect their persons and homes, but also to protect their economic life. The forces have helped Muslims to harvest their rice fields, look for their cattle and have co—operated in their normal economic activities. In the case of displaced Tamils, they say that if the problem was genuinely with Muslim homeguards, just two trained men with guns in a refugee camp would have sufficed to keep them at bay. But, instead after they were attacked by these homeguards, the offer from government forces was significantly to ransport them away.

Protection was never considered nor offered. Far from being protected, their economic activity was not only hindered by terror, but even their material good s were stolen or destroyed. Tamils in Veeramunai, its adjoining villages, central Camp and Akkaraipattu are angry that after their help was utilised in harvesting paddy fields of Muslims, they were attacked and driven away before they could harvest their own fields. Their fields either remain un harvested or are being harvested by Muslims. Refugees in Thirukkovil can be seen going on bicycles through by-lanes to their fields more than ten miles away and returning with a sack of paddy. They run these risks to give their families some basic necessities.

In Batticalca town where the army’s takeover was smooth, disappearances soon commenced and burning bodies began to appear! The worst was the burning of 27 bodies -on Lake Road. Killing, sexual molestation -and rape went on with -impunity. Another significant —development was methodical looting. - A gentleman in Batticaloa, near - Kallady, suddenly found a soldier on his roof removing his TV aeriel. Then went his wash basin, bathroom fittings, electronic goods, new bed sheets etc. A member of the local community who complained to an officer was told that this was being done on orders. Reports of persons being deprived, under threat, of money and jewellery during search operations, are common place. Seven if claims regarding inter�cepted messages between officers and their families are dismissed, the extent and the fact that these stolen goods are being transported south, point to high level complicity. Many an Easterner has said the same thing: “They may let us live, but only as savages.”

In the Amparai District, while Tamils were being evicted from one place after the other, there was an illusion that Thirukkovil and its environs were safe because of the personal generosity of the local STF commander. The last eviction was from Sorikalmunai on 18th September. Several tens of thousands of refugees were now gathered in Thirukkovil, Thambiluvil, Kallianthivu, Sinnathottam and Vinayagapuram. On 20th September, the STF started its round ups in these areas. From the 24th dead bodies, some headless, and heads without bodies started appearing along the coast along Vinayagapuram, Thambiluvil and Thambattai. Refugees who often had no change of Clothes had inadequate shelter aginst the oncoming rains, were hungry and sometimes caught peeumonia, were now stricken with another source of terror. “Whom can we tell these to?”, “Who will do anything at

all?” are anguished cries one frequently hears. Picking up of refugees for human shields during operations has also become a regular practice.

1.2 Why a war against unarmed Tamils:

Why was the Tamil community singled out for such punitive measures? The government had an obli�gation to maintain the law (or what was left of it). Even if the LTTE was identified as the source of lawlessness, what was the justification for identifying the Tamils collectively with the LLTE? As we had pointed out in earlier reports, the government had a lot to do with strengthening and legitimising the LITE's ‘s claim to being the sole legitimate representatives of the Tamil speaking peoples. The government conspired in silencing all dissent. The government, during the earlier half of this year went a long way to enforce the LTTE ‘s authority. Policemen were transferred at its request, extortion� was overlooked ,—the president and his aspiring son had themselves photographed with LTTE leaders for the family album arms had been given and even the governor for the North—East signed an order releasing 40 vehicles for the LTTE 's use . Why then kill Tamils who under duress had followed the example of the state in paying taxes to the LTTE taking photographs, repairing vehicles, driving lorries, or conducting tution classes for the LTrE? Did not the Muslims also co-operate and render crucial material, help to the LTTE and co-operate with them in the same manner that the Tamils had? Furthermore, several independent observers have said that had elections been held in early June, five months after the LTTE had gained control of the East, it would have been hard put to win even one seat. Disillusion�ment with the LTTE had been nearly as far reaching amongst Tamils in the East as it had been amongst Muslims.

If it is argued that the killing of the Sinhalese and Muslim policemen by the UFI’E in June was the issue calling for the punishment of Tamils, there were equally serious matters affecting Tamils for which the state must take responsibility. A few months earlier, the LTTE had killed several hundred Tamil youths from the East conscripted for the Indian sponsored TNA together with members of the CVF, including Muslims, all of whom had surrendered to the LTTE These killings had been done with the connivance of the Sri Lankan state. Did not the government have an obligation under the law to protect children of the nation who had been illegally conscripted? In Thainbiluvil and Thirukkovil alone, the number of TNA conscripts who fell into the LTTE's hands and who were never seen again, is said to number 150 according to local sources. Lawlessness thus did not begin with the killing of policemen. The issue had been distorted because so much had been staked on the LTTE-Premadasa deal that there had been a conspiracy of silence on nearly everyone’s part not to question the ugly things that had happened during the year preceding the war. The Tamils were to a large measure victims of what had been imposed on them.

Why did the government right along choose to ignore the fact that there was serious, if silent, dissent to the politics of the LITE as evident from its constant need for repression, and lump the Tamils with the LTTE? The answer is that while the LTTE? was a prospective ally, it was one force that could be relied upon to work against the democratic aspirations of the people of Sri Lanka in return for power. This was evident in the service rendered by the LTTE to .the government at the UN Human Rights commission in —during February. When the LTTE fell out on the other hand, it served the - of Sinhalese chauvinist aspirations to treat the Tami1s as a� monolith supportive of the LTTE so as to decimate the Tamils as an entity. It is this that explains the military strategy described earlier. It is calculated to give the initiative to destructive tendencies in Tamil society and thus create a rationale for justifiable genocide.

This all seems very ironical because there was a large body of Tamil opinion in the East, both tired of the LTTE and very upset over the killing of the policemen. A leading Tamil. citizen of Pottuvil told us: “I was very much shaken by what the [ATE had done to the policemen. Many of the Sinhalese policemen were nice young boys. Some of them could hardly write their names in Sinhalese and used to come to me to have money orders written to send their salaries home. By this action, I felt, the L’ITE had degraded the whole race of Tamils. I am even now ready to be killed as a punishment for what was done in the name of Tamils.” There was thus a creative alternative to treat the Tamils with clemency, in accordance with the law, and isolate the LITE politically. This, the government was incapable of.

1.3 Aspects of Sri Lankan Military Strategy in the East:

�It has been pointed out that the main military thrust has been to displace and dispossess Tamils, through random firing and knifing as soon as the forces arrived, and then through mass arrests and disappearances, setting up Muslim homeguards and sometimes Sinhai.ese thugs on rampges and then through looting and destruction of property. It appears that the permitted places of refuge had been more or less chosen before the war broke out. The main refugee concentrations are Thirukkovil� - Thambiluvil and Karaitivu in the Amparai District and Batticaloa town, Mandur and Vantharumoolai in the Batticaloa District. These

are all near the Eastern coast, and few Tamils are living in the interior. We do not know enough about the situation in the Trincomalee District at the time of writing.

Tamils have been driven out of areas in the Amparai District where their economic life was centred. This included colonies 11, 13, 4, 7, 15 and 6 in Central Camp, and also Malwattai, Walathapiddy, Mallikaitivu, Puthunagar, Kanapathipuram, Veeramunai and Sorikalmunai in the Central Camp police area. Sinhalese who were in Cenral Camp colonies 3, 10, 9 and 26 had left on their own at the outbreak of troubles.� Only the Muslims remain in colonies 12, 5, as well as some in 6 and 15. Tamils had also teen driven away from settlements in the Gal Oya scheme such as Inginiyagala by Sinhalese hooligans backed by the police. In July, barely a month after the war, 9 Sinhalese villages in the Central Camp colonisation scheme along the border were administratively transferred from Batticaloa to Amparai District.

When the forces moved into towns in the Amparai District, those picked out for elimination from lists provided by Muslim collaborators were often Tamil government servants and educated persons. In Pottuvi the first on the list was the Tamil Assistant Government Agent, next a senior Tamil doctor in the local -hospital and third a Tamil head master. The first had a narrow shave,, the second is missing since June and the third was taken by the police in July and did not reappear. In Akkaraipattu, a large number of the 37 or so Tamils eliminated in

the first round were government servants. The same pattern could be seen in Karaitivu and other places. As soon as the army entered Karaitivu, 26 or so educated persons were picked out, thrust into a room and were subject to grenade explosions and automatic firing. Only 3 escaped with injuries.

When it came to Tamil government servants, there may have been genuine, though misplaced Muslim anger, after the LTTE s killing of policemen. This was because during the preceding months Tamil, and even Muslim, government servants, often against their own judgment, had been forced to take orders from the LTTE because of instructions coming from the president. himself. The commanders of the forces knew that these lists were mostly prepared on the basis of misjudgments, vindictiveness and ambitions over territory and power. But a deliberate decision had been made, to act on them. In some instances Tamils on lists had been saved by the last minute intervention of superior officers.

It is not difficult to see a clear strategy and a method behind the madness. The strategy chosen is one which reconciles a misplaced counter-insurgency strategy with the aims of Sinhalese chauvinism. That is why we have argued that genocide is a logical consequence of Sinhalese chauvinist ideology.

1.4 The nature of the Sri- Lankan forces:

�1n examining operation in the East the nature of the Sri Lankan forces clearly emerges. Their evolution has paralleled the degeneration of the political forces culture in this country. These forces~ now act without any sensitivity to the law. The police are neither a fighting force nor a law enfor�cing authority. The army has become increasingly corrupt and undisci�plined. It is in this state of affairs that the Special Task Force (STF) was selected and trained by the British SAS as an elite unit within the police force. From the beginning it has been subject to stricter rules and discipline. In having to operate a military policy, the three had to be used according to their talents.

There has been very little actual fighting in the Batticaloa and Aznparai Districts. Corruption in the army and commissions at sentry points had become institutionalised as the 80’s advanced. Loot had become one of the significant motivating factors. This too appears to have been regularised as our reports suggest. These attributes had their use in the Batticaloa district when it came to creating a general state of fear and insecurity. In most of the Amparai District, the army was used in the first wave and then the STF took over Thirukkovil-Tambiluvil which has functioned as a place of refugee has been very carefully handled by the STF from the start.

The STF has not generally been associated with random firing, looting, rape and arbitrary elimination. Its methods are to target people on the basis of information, or to round up large numbers and parade them before informers. Those picked up are ruthlessly tortured.. Whoever is released would hardly look human. The rest appear as corpses in various places, some burnt, some without heads and some floating in the sea. This had been the general pattern in the South. Such deliberate terror is combined with gestures of cordiality towards leading members of society and even some material help to the public at large. In this way protest and criticism are neutralised for the present. The STF is compared with the police and the army and is frequently well spoken of, and its repressive purpose is lost sight of in the overall scheme of things. Its frequent use of civilian shields too is not talked about. Such an image serves a purpose in elaborate dramas.

In Veeramunai, the refugee camp was attacked on 12th August by Muslim hoodlums backed by the police. - At Sorikalmunai on the 18th -September, following such an attack tne army fired at refugees trying to flee the church. In both cases people felt reassured after the STF came and offered the refugees safe passage. At Veerarnunal it was seldom asked why the STF which was about a mile away from the loud commotion took over one hour to arrive. People quite often said, had the STF not arrived just then, hundreds more would have been killed. Such a division of labour serves the overall purpose.

It is the dominant character of each force as an institution that comes out in its functioning. Where people have lost all hope they clutch onto individual officers whom they regard as decent and different from others. But when one looks closely, individuals with such benign reputations find important uses in the repressive scheme. An officer with such a reputation was put in charge of Thirukkovil� Thambiluvil which was designated to take in refugees. For 2 months there was great relief. Then commenced the picking up of people from camps and the appearance of bodies. In the end the nature of the STF as an institution asserted itself, whatever the officer’ s personal inclinations.

Many officers assured civilians that they would not touch persons who had nothing to do with the LTIE after the outbreak of the war. They themselves offered the reasons. If not they said, they must first shoot President Premadasa and other members of the cabinet who had given the lead and had helped the LTIE tremendously. Even the STF had worked with the LTTE and had protected its leaders. These assurances were tragically breached mostly totally unreasonable ways. A deeply ingrained character of these forces is racism, and besides this there is tremendous pressure on individual officers. A convoy of vehicles conveying journalists and dignitaries went to Thangavelayuthapuram, to the place where the bodies of policemen killed by the LTTE were buried. Three Tamil civilians found on the road were hauled into the last vehicle by members of the forces and were killed. In another instance during the journey, an officer intervened to prevent a civilian from being killed. Others who went along heard mutterings from the men about the officer having to be the son of a Tamil mother. Similar stories are not infrequent. When there is talk about an officer being good with Tamil civilians, there may be complaints and petitions. Some officers have attributed these to Muslim interests. Furthermore careers of officers will suffer unless they prove themselves useful to the aims of the dominant political ideology. In such a political climate whether in military or in administration, individuals do not count.

1.5. The workings of Sinhalese chauvinism and its limitations:�

An octogenarian in Thirukkovil who was familiar with the present site of Amparai town in the 1930’s described it thus: “There were then precisely 15 Sinhalese families living on the edge of the tank. They did not do paddy cultivation, but cultivated cholam (maize) and kurukkan. They were friendly. I would go there in a bullock cart with a supply of betel, which I gave them, and then hunted venison. They helped me to dry it and I gave them a share. We breakfasted on kurakkan cake which went down with a coconut shell full of honey. Now, large numbers of Sinhalese have been settled on land where once the elephant, deer, leopard, monkey and the bear roamed. I have no quarrel with that and I wish them well. But let us also live! The plight of my Tamil people today is so depressing,that I do not wish to live much longer.”

Indeed, what is objectionable to the Tamils here is not that the agricultural potential of the region was tapped and Sinhalese were settled from the late 40 ‘s. What is objectionable is that the workings of the scheme was absorbed into the political culture of Sinhalese chauvinism and now seeks to deny the Tamils a legitimate place in the region. The state machinery, both administrative and military, is being used to extirpate and obliterate its rich and historical Tamil cultural associations. For the Tamils, a struggle for identity has now become a struggle for survival. The brutality of the Tigers has provided the pretext for military operations by the state of an ultimately genocidal character.

Amparai town, serves as the district capital of a district that still has a Tamil speaking majority, But anyone going through the town will hardly see any sign in Tamil - nearly all in Sinhalese and English. Going eastwards just out of of town - one comes across Iraikamam, a Muslim village, where ther boards are in Tamil or in Tamil and English. Going North—east towards Batticaloa, a few miles away there is the Tamil village of Malwattai. There is a clear signal regarding the intentions of the state. West of the town is the Gal Oya tank and the agricultural colonisation scheme. In successive waves of anti—Tamil violence since 1958, the Tamil presence in the scheme and in Amparai town has been progressively diluted. The current bout of violence instigated by the forces which has left a large number of Tamil women widowed, may have given the remaining presence a death blow. In the present_state_of military repression, collecting statistics is probably out of the question. One� pointer may be that perhaps the majority, if not nearly all, the male children attending the Tamil Maha Vidyalayam in Amparai town, are now no more. The school had an attendance of 600.

It is not accidental that this process has been aided and abetted by the administrative machinery. It has been moving systematically towards making the district majority Sinhalese. The voting population in the region during the 1989 elections was: Tamil - 48,000, Muslim -240,000 and Sinhalese — 234,000. The Sinhalese voting population was increased by about 100, 000 through transferring a part of Moneragala District including the town of Siyambalanduwe to Amparai and by the recent settlement of Sinhalese colonists in the Mahaweli scheme. After the current war broke out, 9 Sinhalese villages from Central Camp in the Batticaloa District were administratively shifted to Amparai. Some moves made in the 80 ‘s are curious. Pottuvil, a, Tamil and Muslim AGA ‘s division was broken up and a new Lahugala division was created. This division has a very small population of 1600, most Sinhalese, families. It includes Panama 10 miles south of Pottuvil, which has no direct access to Lahugala. A person from Panama wanting to transact business has now, instead of going just to Pottuvil, has to go to Pottuvil and another 8 miles west to Lahugala. This move was obviously made to facilitate Sinhalese colonisation.

Other moves made since June have the same discriminatory character. The North-East provincial council stands dissolved and its functions are overseen by the governor. Foreign aid was given for improving telecommunication facilities in Jaffna. This is now reportedly being administratively transferred to Amparai. The post of DIG of police for the North-East has been scrapped. A superintendent of police has now been appointed as co-ordinator for the East. He was a UNP candidate at the last elections and has been publicly making statements to the effect that it is public servants from Jaffna who had introduced terrorism to the East. This would appear not only to justify some of the killings by the forces, but also signals a campaign. to replace Tamil public servants holding responsible positions in the East.

This is evident: in the way Amparai, the capital of the district by that name has been handled. Its large Tamil middle class population has again been decimated. From the 50s and 60’s, the administration of this largely Tamil speaking district has been Sinhalised, facilitating, state sponsored colonisation of Sinhalese. [See Chapter 4]. Since June, there has been such a state of unchecked indiscipline by the forces, that Tamil public servants cannot function in Amparai. The seriousness of this can be seen from the experience of injured refugees from Veeramunai at Amparai hospital. Tamil public servants reporting in Amparai are humiliated at sentry points. In this situation, the Tamil Deputy Director for Irrigation in Amparai, and the Regional Director for Health Services have been replaced by junior appointees. The Tamil clerk in the Pottuvil Pradeshya Sabha was killed by the police on 5th Otober, and there is a clear signal for Tamils not to get back.

What we can see is a resumption with a vengeance, of the course being followed by the state, until India intervened to dictate a political settlement in 1987. It also shows how inadequate the Tamil response has been, particularly the destructiveness of the LTTE.

Sinhalese chauvinism is the ideology of the ruling class which seeks to perpetuate its power through a racist populism instead of addressing real questions of social and economic justice. Genuine democracy is alien to it, and in place of genuine developnent, it has stifled its people and has lowered the standing and strength of the country as a whole. Its own crises have brought about a state of external dependence, multinational penetration in agriculture, particularly in Sinhalese areas, two parallel insurgencies in the North and South, high military spending and even direct Indian intervention.

Through a mismanagement of its foreign relations, it had pinned its hopes crucially on the oil rich Middle East, itself in a stateof crisis, for bath economic and military assistance. In seeking to suppress the Tamils in the East, the state was logically led, aided by the Tigers, to stir up Muslim—Tamil enmity, and campaign in the Islamic world that the government was trying to protect the Muslims. This has gone to ridiculous limits. By September, the majority of Tamils in the East were either refugees or were living in fear of leaving their homes. The LTTE’s effectiveness had greatly declined. On 20th September following the killing -of 4 Muslim fishermen at sea, Muslim home-guards armed by the government, went into the Tamil village of Puthukudiyiruppu� -and killed about 17 Tamils. It had been clear for some time that Tamils had no protection against these home guards. When Tamil political parties complained, the government chose to represent the incident as communal violence. -

But many Sinhalese military and government officials on the ground in the East see it very differently. In the Amparai District, they are conscious that the majority of Tamils and a large number of Sinhalese (eg. Central Camp) have fled. Only the Muslims remain largely where they were, continuing with their economic life and education. Appeals for aid for Muslim refugees are mostly looked upon as fake. The anxiety felt by these officials shows itself in curious ways. A senior Leftist politician in Colombo described a conversation with a leading military official in the East. On the subject of Sinhalese refugees, this official said, “Tell me where they are. I will arrest them and bring them back!” They look upon Sinhalese settlers as soldiers and fail to understand that they are human beings with legitimate fears. The fact is that in areas like Central Camp and Pottuvil, the Sinhalese had good relations with Tamils, and many had intermarried. In such cases, Sinhalese would feel uncomfortable about returning to areas from which Tamils had been driven out, and live with Muslim home guards. Even if the LTTE had been weakened in the East, Sinhalese are bound to have fears of newly fed ambitions of certain Muslim interests. What the government has unintentionally let loose by allying with unruly Muslim elements enjoying unchecked power, is bound to complicate things even further, creating perhaps more determined opposition to the Sinhalese chauvinist agenda. What we see now in Sinhalese officialdom are just the beginnings

of panic. One often hears from such officials to the effect, “We like to be fair by the Tamils. But the government is powerless. The Muslims are very powerful. They are in the SLMC, in the UNP and the SLFP and are constantly lobbying with Middle East”

Thus an ideology which sought to assert Sinhalese power in an oppressive manner must again and again find itself cornered into positions of weakness. This has also been the historical experience of the Tamil militancy. That is why basic human rights and principles of justice cannot be dis regarded with impunity. Unless there arise Tamil and Muslim leaderships which will talk on the basis of these principles, the future of ‘the East looks very dim.

1.6. The Disintegration of the State:

What is essential for the stability of a state is the respect for human principles and basic laws that have a universal character. When these are maintained the various institutions that function under the state can discharge their functions without the hindrance of narrow loyalties such as party, race or religion. Despite India’s other failings, its considerable success in keeping narrow loyalties out of its civil and security services, has preserved a sense of stability for the foreseeable future. When these principles cease to operate, transient group loyalties and paranoidal suspicions become the basis for everything. The state is then on the threshold of disinte�gration.

In the East of this country in particular, and in the higher reaches of the civil and security services in this country, Tamils are being isolated at every level. In the security services, the Tamil presence had sharply declined over the years. Tamils, whose abilities, training and experience could be used to the benefit of the people in this country, are being shunted into positions of no consequence, wasting their energies in obstacle races. For a Tamil public servant to haggle long hours with deliberately placed obst ructions, to get a small quantity of food or medicine into war stricken Tamil areas has become worthwhile labour.

The following illustrates the current plight of Tamil public servants in the East: When the STF came into a town in mid June, most of the people fled elsewhere, though the public servants largely remained. A very senior public servant was pulled out of his office by the STF. An STF man asked his officer (who is currently an QIC of a station) whether to finish him off there itself. The officer replied, “Eyah loku ekkenek, methana dhanda honda nehe’ (He is a big man, it is not nice to finish him here). Th~ public servant—waited in the grounds with his captors for the arrival of a South African, Buffel armoured car, which was to take him to his.: / execution. In the meantime a Muslim mob arrived and heaped accusations against him, to the effect that he was a terrorist. The OIC asked them to take him and finish him off. Some Muslims came with wooden poles in, order to beat him to death. A Muslim teacher well disposed towards him, saved him by telling the mob, ‘The STF took him. It is their business to finish him. Why do you want to take on the Muslims the blame for finishing this man?’ The mob had second thoughts and went away.

Shortly afterwards the Buffel arrived. Just then a jeep arrived with an STF officer having the rank of Assistant Superintendent (ASP), who inquired,, who the intended victim was. The QIC replied that he was the .... (He was ignorant of the difference between public service ranks)., The ASP then promptly took him away, left him in a church with some biscuits and aerated water, and thus saved his life.

Following the removal of the Tamil Deputy Inspector General of Police for the North-East, a superintendent had been appointed as Coordinating Officer for the East. This man represents one of the wonders of the Sri Lankan system inaugurated by President Jayewardene. In keeping with the British system public servants cannot seek parliamentary office. This man resigned from the police, contested in the� East as a ruling party (UNP) candidate, was unsuccessful, and was reinstated into public office by a cabinet decision. He has been making public statements, once at the public function for the President in Pottuvil, that it is public servants from Jaffna who introduced terrorism to the East. This campaign launched from high places is in keeping with the evolving tendency to do away with Tamil influence in public life. It also explains what almost happened to the senior Tamil public servant and what actually happened to many Tamil government servants in the East. The policy of humiliating and driving away Tamils in positions from the East, apart from ordinary Tamils, is evident in day to day life.

When the bus carrying public servants for regular con�ferences in Amparai stops at sentry points, the order rings out, ‘Demala baginda!’ (Tamils get down!). Muslim public servants remain seated, while Tamils have to get down to be searched.

Once group considerations become the main basis of public life, it is not simply Tamils who would lose out. The cancer must extend to every form of tribal consideration. This was seen in the South during the last two years. During the JVP troubles, at least one Vice Chancellor of a university and several university teachers were placed on hit lists. Because of the anarchy surrounding the state, there is doubt as to who killed Professor Patuwattavithana, Vice Chancellor of Moratuwa University. Irrational suspicion was directed against them, because universities cannot be run like military academies. In the case of the Tamil public servant referred to, he was on a hit list despite the fact that the LTTE had taken him thrice to the jungle for questioning.

In such a situation, the state loses all character. When one asks what the state means to him, he will not be able to point to any stable principle. Loyalty to it would hinge on the ability to obtain personal favours and perks from those in charge. There is no Sri Lankan identity today. Is there any will to work towards one?

The disintegration of the state that began with the state inspired 1983 racial violence& reached new heights during the JVP troubles, has reached a new phase in the East. Because the LTTE provoked undisciplined and brutalised state forces, reprisals were to be expected. But combined with the state’s anti—Tamil outlook, what is being encouraged or condoned in the East, is routine criminality. Looting of property has

become part of the game. Tamils trying to collect wages for labour, who are successful in trade, or who try to collect money owed to them, have been pointed out to the police as Tigers. It is not that the forces do not know this. The STY when complained to privately often points the finger at the police. What will happen when these forces deal with troubles in Sinhalese areas the next time round?

CHAPTER 2 THE RISE OF THE TIGER AND THE PLIGHT OF THE PEOPLE

2.1 Before June:

The following sketch which is mainly based on information gathered in the Amparai District traces the events lead�ing to the war of June 1990. It complements accounts contained in earlier reports.

Towards the end of October 1989, the IPKF withdrew from the Amparai District, pretending that the TNA which it had helped to conscript would protect the provincial council administration from the concert of the LTTE and the Sri Lankan forces. The Sri Lankan government termed the TNA an illegal. army, while its existence was denied by the EPRLF led provincial administration. On 5th November 1989, at dawn, the LTTE simultaneously attacked the TNA camps at Thirukkovil and Thambiluvil with material help from the Sri Lankan forces. The first was under TELO control and the second under EPRLF central. Three of the LTTE attackers at Thirukkovil were killed. TNA casualties were reportedly higher. TNA conscripts, many of whom who wanted to surrender, are said to have been made to fire at the LTTE under duress. Eventually, the defenders fled. 150 TNA conscripts surrendered to the LTTE from Thirukkovil and Thaxnbiluvil. Many discarded weapons and uniforms of the TNA were found in the area, as their owners fled. The LTTE collected the weapons and took them away in tractors, to Thangavelayuthapuram. A community leader who approached the LTTE regarding the conscripts, was told that they would be released. The LTTE withdrew the same day when two TNA columns, one from Akkaraipattu led by Razik, came from the north. The TNA remained for about two weeks under the leadership of Karunakaran, MP for Batticaloa. During this period, the people were subject to much hardship and harassment.

Then commenced the disastrous withdrawal of the TNA in the wake of the advancing Sri Lankan forces and the LTTE. At Akkaraipattu, the TNA fired at the police before quitting. In Ka.raitivu, the Muslim policemen, about 40, were separated and killed by the TNA. At Savalakkadai, members of the provincial police trained by the IPKF, the CVF, jumped into the lagoon as the Sri Lankan army advanced. 50 of them were mowed down by .a Sri Lankan helicopter gunship. The LTTE was-welcomed everywhere with great acclaim, not least by the Muslims.

Tensions within the LTTE however did not surf ace into the open at that time. The LTTE leader for Thirukkovil— .:Thambiluvil was an Anthony from the locality who commanded considerable popularity, as a person who understood and dealt competently with local problems. Anthony is said to have expressed unhappiness over a demand from the LTTE high-command to send 300 cadre from the East, to fight the TNA in the North. Antony and those close to him, were removed from the region in December, commencing a disastrous chapter.

Mathan who was the next leader for -the area was a disaster. The story was the same in most places in the East - more disastrous than in Jaffna. In comparison with the organization ^�which had a number of thoughtful dedicated people in the early 80’s, the weakness of the organization’s ideology, and its totalitarianism, had steadily deprived it of cadre who could understand the people and could talk to them. The leadership had only use for pawns. In one of the public discussions in the East earlier this year, a question was posed referring to Amirthalingam’s murder, why the organisation was killing educated Tamils. Karikalan, the political chief of Batticaloa replied:

“Why are you so concerned about education? We have cadre with 8th standard education doing medical work treating injuries, and with 5th standard education working in arms factories”.

This was the same organisation that had campaigned about educational oppression in Jaffna. Through its organisation ROOTE, it was trying to get the educated Tamil professional elite in Colombo and abroad, to work for it by showing them a different face. The quality of leadership of the LTTE in the East, and the manner in which people were spoken to, were symbolic of the esteem in which people were held. In Jaffna, the message was slower in coming. Even those like Karikalan, who perhaps believed in what they said, are ultimately pawns.

The killing of several hundred TNA conscripts was apparently done after some changes in leadership, such as the transfer of Anthony. This grieved easterners very much, because here the Tamils were an endangered, and backward community. When young boys joined the militancy in 1983, they were hardly conscious of group differences. It is often on going to India that they came to know their group affiliation. A community that could ill—afford to lose young men, was now seeing them killed in large numbers for unjustifiable reasons.

�The conscripts had mostly carried arms under duress. Only the Sri Lankan government which abetted their killing could gain some satisfaction. The Muslims had approached the LTTE regarding 18 Muslim members of the CVF who had surrendered to them. A reply was reportedly given that they had been taken to Jaffna for training. There had been no further word about them.

The LTTE which was welcomed in Tamil and Muslim areas i.n late 1989, soon caused grave misgivings. Tiger rule also led to mis�givings on the economic side. Taxaation was more keenly felt by those who had money, particularly the professional class and the Muslim businessmen, causing them to move out. Almost every one / was hit by the taxation and by the LTTE taking command of certain sectors, such as the timber trade. Those who grew paddy or who collected sea—sand for sale were all subject to taxes. Those having tea boatiques complained that the Rs.500 monthly tax demanded of them was close to their income—unlike their counterparts in Jaffna who did a brisk trade. In some places the LTTE took over from private hands, the cultivation of temple paddy fields. The priority in the direction of water resources was given to these fields over the neighbouring fields. In Thirukkovil, destruction was caused to neighbouring fields, when after these had been ploughed and sown, tractors were driven over them to. plough the LTTE’s fields. After the June war broke out, the LTTE withdrew with the keys to the irrigation locks. A local community leader observed, “Whoever came with a gun, whether official forces or liberators, destroyed both the economy and the people”.

Many local observers said that the LTTE which commanded widespread support in January and would have made a clean sweep if elections were held, in both Muslim and Tamil areas, had become very unpopular by June. People then regarded them no better than they had regarded the pro-Indian groups in December 1989.

2.2. The outbreak of the June war:

�Several aspects of this have been discussed in UTHR (J) Report No.4. This section will give some additional local information together with some supplementary infor�mation gathered later. On 11th June, the LTTE surrounded many police stations in the Amparai and Batticaloa Districts and called upon the policemen to surrender. At Pottuvil, the LTTE started arriving at the police station from 10.00 a.m., one or two at a time-. By about 5.30 p.m. there were about 15 LTTE cadre around the Pottuvil police station. As the situation evolved the police�men anxiously listened to communications on their radio network. The Assistant Superintendent at Kalmunai communicated what was evidently an order from Colombo. He said that the police were not receiving support from the other forces to resist the LTTE. The police were asked by him to surrender their weapons. The LTTE had in turn assured the policemen that they would not be harmed.

�The demand that the policemen at Pottuvil should surrender by 6.30 p.m. was made at about 75.30 p.m. This was in turn communicated to the police command. According to Tamil police�men who were at the station, they were reasonably well armed with machine guns and heavily put numbered the LTTE. They were confident that they could resist the LTTE. The army at Lahugala 8 miles away, and the STF at Arugam Bay 3 miles south, urged the Pottuvil Police to resist., and promised them support. The policemen we spoke to, said that they felt at this point that although they could have easily resisted., in view of the harm that would have befallen civilians, the high command’s decision to surrender was a wise one. .The fighting at Kalmunai appears to have resulted from policemen resisting against the orders of the ASP. The police at Pottuvil informed Lahugala and Arugam Bay that they were surrendering to avoid trouble. This was about 6.30 p.m. Significantly, several of the policemen were from Pottuvil itself.

When the LTTE was told of this, they reassured the police that no harm would come to them. Some of the Sinhalese policemen were so innocent and ignorant, that they did not know what surrender meant. They wanted to know whether they should come crawling with their arms on their backs. They were just anxious to avoid trouble. The LTTE asked them to drop their arms and come out. The policemen were then put into commandeered buses and taken to Vinayagapuram, with the assurance that they would report back for work at their stations in two days. Vinayagapuram was 2 miles south of Thirukkovil and 20 miles north of Pottuvil. Of the 120 policemen at Pottuvil, 60 were Tamils and the rest Sinhalese and Muslims. To Vinayagapuram were also brought the policemen who had surrendered elsewhere in the Amparai District. The time was about 9.30 p.m. From the confused talk of the LTTE cadre, the policemen understood that something sinister was afoot. Some cadre thought that the Tamil policemen were to be killed and the others would be spared. Others thought the reverse. The policemen were then asked for their names and were divided into two lots depending on whether they were thought to be Tamils or others. Policemen of mixed origin who gave their Tamil name were put into the Tamil group. All policemen were bound, gagged and assaulted.

2.3. The massacre of policemen:

All circumstances surrounding this tragedy, point to it being a consequence of a decision taken by the LTTE leadership at local level, about which the area leaders came to know only after, the policemen had surrendered —i.e. probably after 6.00 p.m. This is important because several Tamil policemen, both those who had surrendered and had been released by the LTTE as well as those who had been on leave, have been murdered by the forces. A number of Sinhalese policemen escaped the massacre because they had taken leave for the poson holiday which fell 3 days earlier. Likewise, a number of Tamil policemen had been on leave. The annual Amman Kovil poosai at Thambiluvil fell on 10th June, the day before the tragedy, and was an event occasioning the reunion of Hindu natives of Thirukkovil and Thambiluvil, scattered over the island. It is now a common assumption amongst the forces that Tamil policemen on leave had been tipped off by the LTTE.

Let us examine the evidence. According to local sources, the decision to kill the non—Tamil policemen was taken after the surrender and caused misgivings amongst local leaders, particularly those who were natives of the’ area. Like their police counterparts they were concerned about the consequences for the people of-the area who were their kith and kin. Those who protested were in turn told that if they did not conform, they would be killed. A concrete event which substantiates these sources is that on sensing what would happen to the surrendered policemen, the LTTE leader of Samanthurai, a Muslim town, asked the surrendered police�men to run and get away. They were thus spared. The LTTE leader has not been heard of since then. Ironically, it was the Muslim home guards in Samanthurai, who in concert with the forces, were to unleash abloody reign of terror on the Tamils in the adjoining also points to a last minute decision. A number of people in this country did sense trouble through other indications. But we may rule out the possibility of the LTTE having tipped off individual policemen.

We have suggested in our Report No.4 that the LTTE high -command was not aware of the decision to kill the policemen. This is given substance by the factor that while this drama was taking place in Batticaloa and Amparai districts, no orders had been apparently issued to the LTTE local leadership in the Trincomalee district. It was on 13th June that the LTTE leader in Trincomalee called on the high ranking police officer with whom he was friendly, used his telephone and talked to him over a cup of tea. The LTTE leader told his friend that they both had their orders, hinting that a parting of ways had come. It was on the 13th evening that the LTTE killed 14 captured police— men and asked the Tamils in Trincomalee to flee.

Who was then responsible for the decision to kill the policemen on 11th June? According to local sources, the person immediately responsible was a high ranking member of the local command known as Cashier. This is also the impression of police�men who were under detention at Vinayagapuram, who saw Cashier.

According to local lore surrounding Cashier, he was a university student who like the late Mr. Pulendran of Trincomalee, was affected by what the Sri Lankan forces had done to his family. The story behind his nickname is again very suggestive of the legacy of the 1983 racial violence. Cashier had once led an attack on a Sinhalese hamlet in Lahugala. He is said to have submitted his report in the form of a cash memo — so many women, so many children etc. Earlier this year, a ship carrying timber from East Asia had run aground off Komari. The cargo of timber was brought ashore by the LTTE and was sold to merchants for a large sum — put at Rs.30 million by local sources. This windfall according to locals, eased their tax burden. This money is said to have been held by Cashier.

Getting back to Vinayagapuram on the night of 11th June, the policemen lay on the ground after being bound, gagged and beaten. A section of their Sinhalese and Muslim colleagues were loaded into buses and taken to Thangavelayuthapurarn, to the edge of the jungle near Rufus Kulam (Tank). On hearing the gun shots, the policemen in Vinayagapuram guessed what had happened. Young Tiger recruits too were involved in the operation. Those not taken, hungry and without food, were allowed to ease themselves and marched into a school building. Some of those who complained to their young captors that their knots and blindfolds were painfully tight, had them tightened further. The following day, their blindfolds were removed, and they were given tea and rice for the first time. On the 12th night, the remaining

Sinhalese and Muslim policemen, were similarly taken to the jungle and killed. Even before this, the police at Amparai had started to go beserk, killing Tamils, both their colleagues as well as ordinary civilians. What began as a routinely allowed act of indiscipline, was to soon take the shape of state policy towards Tamils of the region.

2.4 Negotiations in Jaffna:

By 15th June, fighting had erupted in the East, but not yet in Jaffna. A final effort was made on this day by the government’s negotiator with the LTTE, Mr. A.C.S. Hameed, Minister for Justice. With the earlier ceasefire of 13th June having broken down, the effort being made here was to secure a ceasefire in the North and talk about the East in due course. The following account is from sources close to the Minister.

The Minister landed at Palaly air base, and his party was driven to an LTTE camp 10 miles towards town, in LTTE vehicles. The LTTE leadership was represented by Mahattaya, Balasingam and Yogi. Mrs Balasingam was present. A ceasefire was agreed upon, which was to take effect the following day. It was agreed that they would all meet shortly after 9.00 a.m. the following morning to place the formal seal on the eeasefire. The minister and his party were to return to Colombo for the night. A member of the party observed that the LTTE was cagey about the arrange�ments for the following day. To questions about essential details for the following day, cryptic answers were received, which betrayed a feeling that tomorrow would not happen. In the arrangements for the following morning, the LTTE wanted the minister to wait outside the base, rather than pick him up from inside as it had done that day. Balasingam cautioned the party that the LTTE sentries may be nervous. A member of the party noticed that Yogi, Mrs. Balasingam and to a lesser extent, Balasingam, were showing evident signs of discomfort and edginess. Mahattaya, however, looked composed. He concluded after the sequel that an elaborate drama was being put on, with which the first three played along without being happy about it.

On the way back to Palaly, one vehicle was driven by Lawrence, who had a weapon on him. A scholar in the party told� a Lawrence that he too had a weapon. Lawrence was puzzled.

The scholar then pulled out his pen and told Lawrence, ‘This is my weapon. One day you will realise that this is more powerful than your guns. Lawrence did not respond.

Back in Palaly base, the party retired to the officers mess. Half an hour later, a salvo of mortar shells fell into the base without causing harm. About the same time, an airman on the tarmac was hit on the thigh by a sniper’s bullet. It did not look like an accidental occurrence of the kind-that Balasingam had hinted at. The air plane that was to take the minister’s party to Colombo was on the tarmac, and much damage could have been caused if it had been so intended. This was read as a signal for the minister not to return the following day. An army top brass who was present said that the army was certainly not keen on a fight. But that if they were made to fight, they would do so with all force. The minister’s party retired to Colombo for the night. Although things looked bad, the minister felt an obligation to return the following day. Owing to the risk involved, he asked others in his party to stay back. When he flew back to Jaffna and contacted the LTTE the following morning, he got the impression that he was not expected. Balasingam who was to meet him, had to be summoned by radio. We do not know the LTTE’s side of the story, but in the end the ceasefire was not to be.

What we had gathered falls into a pattern, long associated with the LTTE. It however seems unlikely that the LTTE had made serious plans for a war beforehand, though involved in a game of brinkmanship. This is suggested by its precipitate withdrawal from towns in the East, after acting as though it was going to confront the army. As in the whole history of the militancy, the aim may have been to cover up the blunder and massacre of policemen in the East, by a bigger one from the point of view of the Tamils. In a crisis of war, the LTTE has always in the past, benefited by the atrocious conduct of the adversary. The LTTE could thus evade accountability.

Where the government was concerned, Mr. Hameed was a moderate, sensitive to minority issues and has used his persuasive powers to try to work out a deal within the framework of the

LTTE—Premadasa understanding. His Task was also a virtually� impossible one. The Sri Lankan State’s ideology and the instinctive brutality of its machinery have an overpowering influence waiting to assert themselves. Moreover a deal with the LTTE was intrinsically unstable, because-it would only help to suppress the basic human rights of Tamils as well as of the others in the country. With Mr. Hameed having reached a dead end, it was time for the state to do its stuff.

2.5. The debacle in the East:

�The LTTE’s pull out from Pottuvil on 15th June has been described separately. Almost in every town, the LTTE made it appear as though it was doing a final battle and that the Sri Lankan forces would be resisted to the finish. But after provoking the forces by killing policemen- and by desecrating the bodies of the 11 soldiers killed in Kalmunai, from 15th June onwards, the LTTE withdrew precipitately from one town after the other.

In Thirukkovil, the LTTE called upon the people to join in the ‘final battle’. Young men with some acquaintance with weapons were asked to man the trenches. About 18th June, the LTTE started pulling out. The young men who had been called out were in a quandary. Whether supportive of the LTTE or not, they had ample reason to fear the Sri Lankan forces and thus had reason to fight. When the LTTE started to pull out, many of them started running towards the jungle tracts to the West. Some were killed in bombing by the air force. Some are still hiding in the jungle. Those who came back to Thirukkovil, fear of being lived;in. picked d up by the STF on information.

As the LTTIE pulled out, they were leaving behind uncleared bunkers, and the road was lined with sentry points made with painted tractor tires, piled one on top of the other and filled with sand. To protect themselves as best as they could, the civilians started dismantling these. In the past such structures had acted as a provocation to the forces to kill anyone in the vicinity. While they were doing this, an LTTE jeep came and� stopped occupants asked the civilians threateningly ‘Do you think we are pulling out? Do not assume that’.

Subsequently, the army had arrived at Akkaraipattu (6 miles north) and the STF at Komari (10 miles south). A group of citizens first approached the army. A Colonel Fonseka told them that they must surrender their young persons, but no harm would befall them. Being suspicious of the army’s intentions, they approached the STE. After coming into occupation of Pottuvil, the STE commandant, Lionel Karunasena, speaking at the Mosque, said that the STE had given tremendous material help to the LTTE, and if people had to be punished for helping the LTTE, they would have to be the first to swallow cyanide.

He promised that no one would be penalised for supporting the LTTE before the war. These assurances were repeated everywhere by STE spokesmen, including to the citizens of Thirukkovil. The STE advanced into Thirukkovil on 26th June behind a human shield of 200 refugees from Pottuvil. Once in Thirukkovil, the former assurances were forgotten. Up to 20th September, local sources said that 30 —35 persons had been picked up and done away with. From 20th September to 5th October, when rounding up of refugee camps commenced, another 40 are said to have disappeared.

In Kalmunai, Karaitivu and Akkaraipattu — nowhere was there fighting or resistance — the army moved in and killed. Among the people there was tremendous anger against the LTTE. Why did the Ltte behave thus? It is believed, including by officials among the forces, that having got into an unplanned crisis, the LTTE leadership decided on the Eastern pull out to deploy greater resources in the North, where greater prestige was staked. .The government claimed that Castro, ~the LTTE’s political leader in Amparmi was killed. According to local sources Castro had been seen after the claim was made and that recent events had resulted in a split in the local leadership of the LTTE. They say that Castro is in the jungle, leading a precarious existence with others who had broken away. We have noted elsewhere that earlier in 1990, the LTTE had enjoyed tremendous Muslim support, of which the final threads were cut by massacres of Muslim civilians. Different sources in the East have quoted local LTTE cadre to the effect that the leadership had ordered pre�emptive action against Muslim cadre. At present these claims have to be treated with some caution. Cashier and his body guard are said to be missing after the massacre of policemen. While the people were angry with the LTTE in June, the

utter brutality of the state naturally drives them to find excuses for the LTTE. One patently absurd story in circulation holds that following the surrender of the policemen, an order to ‘dump their arms’ was misunderstood as ‘dump the policemen’. Others tried to put the blame on individuals like Cashier, with a tragic history. Granting that the leadership did not approve what happened, it is all naturally consonent with LTTE politics. ^Whydid the leadership decline in quality? Why did many able leaders from the East leave the organisation heart broken? Why in an area where the position of Tamils was most precarious, did the LTTE remove leaders like Anthony and put in those like Mathan and Cashier? The answers would point to unmistakaable destructiveness. The whole phenomenon also shows that while the LTTE used the East as a source of recruits, it was not serious about the well—being of the people.

According to local citizens’ committee sources, anything from 3000 of the 54—60000 Tamils in the Amparai District have been killed during the last 4 months. Some responsible persons insist on higher figure. After 4 months of tragedy and the ruinous conduct of the state, the people, most of whom are refugees, have nowhere to turn. After what the government had done to the people with its policemen, soldiers and Muslim Home guards, it has only proved to many angry and helpless people, robbed of their wits that the LTTE was right all along, to massacre policemen, Muslims and Sinhalese. Thus the stage is being set for another act of ’the tragedy. There is the very disturbing news that the LTTE had influenced 50,000 refugees in the Batticaloa district to join them in the jungles and risk ‘nave only absolute distrust for the security forces and that they believe that an escalation is in the offing. There is also widespread talk of a massive recruitment drive by the LTTE in the East. The forces are in turn becoming nervous.

After the LTTE exposed itself in June as being totally undeserving of the people's trust and support, the government in its destructive arproach’ did everything to rebuild the LTTE as a force to be reckoned with. Tamil Nadu politicians and other propagandists can argue with deceptive credibility that without the LTTE, the Tamils are finished. But more than those in. the North, the Tamils in the East are sure of one thing.. The people the economy and the edifying things of life are being steadily destroyed.. The tragedy of the LTTE is not principally one of demented leaders and of young led astray. It is but one of how a large number of leading persons, often with outstanding scholarly attainments, both at home and abroad, embraced a poli— tics which destroyed their community, and become in turn accom�plices in killing their own people.

Chapter 3 PEOPLE AND THEIR PROBLEMS

3.1 Living with the STF:

�We describe in what follows, the experiences of ordinary people in a town in the Amparai District.

Viewed from a distance, one may have thought that the local STF camp was going to be attacked. There were people in multi—coloured attires surreptitiously walking, crouching and peeping, along the lanes and fences surrounding the STF camp, and yet keeping a prudent distance. Getting closer one would have been surprised to find that they were not guerillas in fancy dress, but hungry looking women in ragged sarees and dressing gowns with faces wasted by sorrowing. Many of them were young, and. often pregnant mothers, carrying not rocket launchers, b babies. More little children, and elderly women

�were seated under trees in the sandy lanes, shielding themselves from the scorching sun. Some would let out intermittant cries of agony: “My boy, my boy, they took him four days ago. When I ask about him, they abuse .me and shoo me away as if I were a stray dog."

Upon inquiry, pieces of the whole weird drama fall into place. These people are mothers, wives, sisters and children of persons picked up, either on information, or in round—ups, by the STF. There is no channel by which they could make inquiries or even find out if the missing person were dead or alive. In the first instance they would come and hang about the STF camp. Sometimes there were literally hundreds. The camp had an open barbed wire fence on one side. Their reasoning was that if the person were alive, they should be able to catch a glimpse of him being taken to the toilet or being served a meal. If they could not catch sight of the person for days and if he were not re�leased, the worst was to be assumed. The best they could do is to fill up an appeal for missing persons given out by the local citizens’ committee and another by the ICRC, and let matters rest there. “Whom can we tell this to?”, “Who will listen to us?” are expressions one hears again and again on the streets.

On 24th September, the STF commenced its round—ups. Refugees who had thought they were safe, having braved and survived many dangers, found themselves being picked up again. Gun shots were suddenly heard, and then screams. It was later learnt that a young refugee who tried to flee out of fear, had been .shot by an STF gun man, who then ran after him and stabbed him. Those who were rounded up were then taken in vehicles to the STF camp. The injured boy was carried in, kicking his legs in great pain. A stream of humanity followed the vehicles with exclamations of “Oh, Muruga”, “Oh Jesus” and “Oh Mary”. Those taken were reportedly paraded before informants. The injured boy was admitted to the local hospital and died about midnight. The routine of rounding up con�tinued in the days that followed. Sometimes one saw released persons being escorted home by relatives who had been anxiously hanging about. Some of them had parts of their bodies swollen beyond recognition. Others were wet with hair dripping from their heads as though they had been fished out of a dirty drain.

Passing the camp around 6:00 p.m., noises came from the camp as though a game of volleyball was being played, interspersed with noises of screams and groans. Just then one ran into a herd of cattle, mothers licking young calves with maternal devotion, as though in the reddish glow of the declining sun, all was well with the world. It also seemed an inversion of the normal order of things — human beings in the abbatoir and the cows outside enjoying the freedom of wide eastern spaces. One was happy, all the same, for those cows and calves.

A little later, the television news brought home one of those contrasts in the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. As usual a good deal of time was spent on a religious ceremony, attended by men in immaculate white. Mercifully, the television focus was not on the compassionate one who departed this world 2,500 years ago. The focus was rather on the men in white with clasped hands. They were the gods. Those torturers in the abbatoir must be watching these ceremonies in between their labours, and not without effect. To avoid evil karma, they get persons outside to slaughter chickens for them.

The fruits of the STF’s labour, the news of which spreads like wildfire at dawn, are such gory sights as would send a chill down every spine. September 25th: Early worshippers at the historic Hindu temple are treated to a headless body and a head without a body belonging to another person, brought ashore by the incoming tide. .26th: Two headless bodies. 27th: Three bodies, two in one location and one in another. One of the two bodies was indentified as that of a person in a village a few miles away and the relatives sought permission from the GS to bury it. A little later, the STF surrounded the area and had the other body interred before it could be identified. So it went on, morning after morning, bodies turning up along the. coast for miles. Some in the cre�mation grounds, with heads and without heads. Almost everyone was overcome by a feeling of depression and helplessne1ss.

A young lady graduate teacher told us: “My brother was taken by the STF. I waited long hours outside with the others. I made a request to speak to the camp commandant, and was ignored. While I was there the ICRC representative� came to the camp on a routine visit. I debated whether to talk to her. I gave up the idea because I had heard that prisoners about whom inquiries were made were treated with greater cruelty. Later, the men in the camp stoned us. Some came out with sticks and one with a whip formed by folding a wire, which was swung at me. One old lady fell on the sand, unable to move. One of my slippers came off. I left the other and ran. I returned much later to retrieve my slippers.”

“On another occasion, I saw two men in the camp, supporting on a pole what seemed to be a lifeless body folded in two and carrying it away. Good Lord, they must have tortured him to death. A close relation of mine was killed earlier by the STF as an LTTE supporter. Because members of my family are among the few educated people in the area, many people came to us for help. Our home is noted. Do not so much as mention our names. I am afraid that the STF would finish us all.”

It is now thought that her brother is not alive anymore. A leading citizen in the area told us: “I heard three shots in the night and woke up. I knew that some innocent persons were being done away with and that there was nothing that I could have done. I could not sleep again. The whole situation weighs heavily on my mind. I live as though I could be killed anytime by one side or the other for doing what I think is right by the people. I have lost the fear of death. My windows are kept open in the nights and I say what needs to be said.”

When the STF commander took control of the area, he had acknowledged that leaders of the country and senior persons in the forces had extended their full co—operation to the LTTE and that if the past had to be considered, they would all have to swallow cyanide and be punished. He gave an assurance that they would punish only those who had LTTE connections after the day on which the STF assumed control. It was also evident that anyone with anything like serious LTTE connections would have fled by then. Since the STF assumed con�trol several tens had disappeared from that community before the new wave began with the rounding up of refugees. What had they done and what were their crimes? Garage hands who had repaired vehicles donated to the LTTE by the government; a father of a young family who had been paid to give tuition classes to some LTTE recruits; a lorry driver whose services had been requisitioned by the LTTE to transport some stones or wood; policemen who had been on leave to� attend the local temple festival when the war began and were afraid to report for duty thereafter, and so the list goes on.

Why these killings? Orders to show more results? Petitions from interested parties? Or is it simply what the STF is all about? Some of the other Tamil militant groups are unable to command the dignity becoming of aspiring leaders. They are trying to use the STF for purposes of revenge, just as the LTTE did in its time. From Colombo inquiries are made in devious ways about certain indi�viduals. On the other hand there are persons with no love for the LTTE, who have protected stranded LTTE girls, because the STF would not have treated them according to the law, but would have simply killed them.

In some significant ways, life under the STF is very much like life under the .LTTE. Criticism and protest is FCritici.smand~-protest is effortlessly neutralized, though terrible things happen

�in secret places. Poor women beaten. They may not even have the dignity of worms. But in many quarters, you often hear: “The STF is reasonable, they will not do something without good reason, you can talk to them and they will listen, there is no crime and, robbery...” all of which you heard in LTtE—dominated Jaffna. Little wonder that the STF were sometimes called Green Tigers..

Paddy fields belonging to the temple and cultivated by the LTTE, were harvested under STF supervision. After the temple and the labour were paid, the proceeds were used by the STF commander to buy utensils for refugees. Some logs from illicit timber abandoned by the LTTE were given to a local orphanage. These acts were duly spoken of with high praise.

�3.2, Hostages for a Human Shield:

On 29th September, the STF rounded up 4 tractor loads of Tamils around Thirukkovil. They were old, young, lean, hungry, lame, almost of every type you could name. Many of them were taken from refugee camps where they had been assured of security. These persons were taken to Kanjikudichcharu by a party of the STF. After they had been made to get down, the hostages were marched in front as a mine detonating human shield. Others were held close with an arm by STF men on their exposed side, while the other hand held the automatic. At one point the LTTE fired at them. The STF assked the hostages to lie flat along with them and returned the fire.

Eventually, they reached an LTTE camp, where they found 2 or 3 refrigerators, packets of dhal and sugar and some miscellaneous items. The hostages carried these back. Once again the LTTE fired and the STF fired back, without loss on either side. The fact that there were no mines suggests that it was a minor camp, and that the LTTE presence was sparse.

On returning to base, the hostages were reunited with their anxious families who had been waiting outside the camp. In return for their involuntary esca�pade, the hostages were sent home with some of the LTTE’s provisions. Such things are done regularly, probably on orders from above. In consequence, the people now tend to run on sighting the STF. That has, on a number of occasions, led to tragic results.

3.3 The ICRC Visit:

�On 2nd October, ICRC officials came on a routine visit calling on government officials and citizens’ committee members. At one point some people approached the ICRC and told them that some of their young men had been taken in by the STF. The ICRC then visited the STF camp. Prior to this, some of the people who had kept vigil outside to catch a glimpse of their near ones, had seen a Buffel being driven to one of the buildings. Young men were then loaded inside and the Buffel was driven out of the camp to Ward 1 inthe ad�joining village and was parked 2 to 3 hours there for the duration of the ICRC visit. The Buffel returned to the camp later.

t is understandable that the STF would not like the IGRC to see young men who were badly mauled by torture or who were designated for elimination. The ICRC knows about the dead bodies and heads that are brought in with the tide. In such instances the ICRC cannot be faulted because it had done all it could do. The local citizens' committee has taken up the issue of prisoners and eliminations with the STF. A private assurance has been given that a list of those alive will be given and arrangements will be made for visits by the relatives once a week.

On the question of eliminations, notwithstanding former assurances, the position seems to be that.LTTE activity has been increasing and there are orders from above. When asked, why given the fact that nearly all who are being killed are innocent, the citizens’ committee could not demand for an end to these elimina�tions, a member replied: “The Amnesty International and the ICRC cannot do anything. What can we do?” Lacking solidarity from human rights organisations human in this country and elsewhere, such isolated groups of citizens are forced to�� conform to the rules of the game laid down by the STF or the LTTE as the case may be. It is now nearly 4 months since the war began. There are several, well funded NGO’s in Colombo dealing with Ethnfc Studies and Human Rights. But hardly any serious attempt has been made to find but and protest about what is happening in the East. If that had been done, international organizations like Amnesty International and the ICRC would have been able to do their work much better.