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Special Report No: 17  

Date of release: 7th October 2003

 

Rewarding Tyranny: Undermining the Democratic Potential for Peace

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Summary

Child Soldiers:

Political Opponents:

Muslims:

Rewarding Tyranny: Undermining the Democratic Potential for Peace

I. INTRODUCTION:

The Diplomatic Blitz and the Message

The War on Terrorism and Sri Lanka

What of the People?

II. REWARDING MURDER AND DISINTEGRATION

III. FANNING EMBERS IN THE EAST

Mutur: April, 2003

LTTE Statements on the events

May-July, 2003: Continuing Provocation and a New Trend

The Incidents of August 2003

Context Of Conscription

The Sammanthurai Murders

The LTTE’s Obsession with the EPRLF(V)

The LTTE, the State and Tamil Insecurity in Mutur

Buried Links in the Disappearance of Adrian Selvan

The Withered Tree – the Demise of a Family

The New Vanniars

Children and the New Bondage: the LTTE’s Compulsory Military Training

Conscription in the Amparai and Batticaloa Districts: An Unexpected Turn in Valaichchenai

An Impenetrable Wall of Silence

Current Trends

6th October: An Unexpected Turn of Events in Valaichchenai

Fallout from the Valaichchenai Protest

Branding the Very Young

UNICEF’s Role and De-Conscription of Child Soldiers

Ceremony, Misery and a Plaintive Cry

IV. TRENDS IN THE NORTH

Jancy’s Ordeal: In the Dark Shadows of Pongu Thamil

A New Turn in Hartley College, Point Pedro

V. MUSLIM POLITICS: TAMIL HISTORY REPEATING ITSELF?

Militancy in Mutur

The Limitations of TULF – SLMC Politics

VI. INTENSIFICATION OF ATTACKS ON OPPONENTS AND FORMER OPPONENTS

Murdered

Abducted and Missing

Beaten, Harassed or Attempt on Life

VII. DISPLACEMENT, REFUGEES AND THE LOGIC OF FAIT ACCOMPLI

No Peace Without Challenging Ideologies of Conflict

Rallying Extremism in the South

The Dangerous Logic of Fait Accompli

The Advance of Hubris

Appendix I

Cases of Conscription and Forcible Induction of Children

LTTE-Controlled hinterland of Mutur:

Batticaloa District

Amparai District

Jaffna

Vavuniya

Appendix II

Persons detained in forced labour camps on account of their escaped children

Appendix III

A Tribure to Subathiran by a Tamil Coward, from the Ceylon Daily News, 21st June 2003

Robert's indictment

                                                     Summary

This latest report by UTHR(J) examines grave contradictions between the rhetoric of peacemaking in Sri Lanka over the past 21 months and its reality.  UTHR(J) contends that while the LTTE leaders were honing their diplomatic skills abroad, their cadres were carrying out their orders for military and political expansion, terrorising opponents and sowing communal discord at home.   

Special Report 17, Rewarding Tyranny: Undermining the Democratic Potential for Peace, provides documentary evidence of the LTTE’s continued abuse of civilians: killing of political opponents, violence against Muslims and conscription of children, and shows the destabilizing effect of these activities on Sri Lankan society.  Communal violence is on the rise, and party and inter-party squabbles at the parliamentary level are growing increasingly bitter.  The report warns that the LTTE’s concurrent military build up and strategic deployment threatens not only Sri Lankan security, but the security of the region.

UTHR(J) remains critical of the continued “appeasement” policy towards the Tigers, practiced most strenuously by the UNP and Norway but also embraced by other international and local institutions.  The strategy, no doubt intended to persuade the LTTE to continue to engage in talks, has also encouraged its utter disregard for international norms.

As the new report notes: “the course of the ‘peace process’ tells its own story very clearly:” 

 Child Soldiers:

Contrary to all expectations of the agreement signed with the UNICEF to oversee the demobilization of child soldiers, the LTTE has once again intensified its conscription programme, renewing its demand for one child per family in several eastern districts, while making aggressive intrusions upon school children in the North.  In Batticaloa the SLMM received on average 5 complaints of child conscription every week during the first three weeks of September from parents brave enough to come forward. Reports on the ground suggest further intensification subsequently.

 Political Opponents:

Democratic opponents and their families, (and others long out of politics) continue to be targets of LTTE violence. The report documents the cases of at least twelve murders and seven unresolved “disappearances” of persons abducted by the LTTE in August and September.  Several serious assaults resulting in injuries serious enough to require hospitalization were also reported.

Muslims:

LTTE violence against Muslims and constraints imposed by the Tigers on Muslim economic activities are creating a dangerous situation in eastern Sri Lanka. Muslim anger erupted in April and August in Mutur in the face of provocations by the LTTE that left 9 Muslims and 4 Tamils dead and substantial property destroyed in both communities with Muslims suffering disproportionately. In related incidents 2 Muslims were killed in Sammanthurai and 2 disappeared in Valaichchenai.  In the wake of the violence, the LTTE increased the pressure by banning Tamils in Mutur and the surrounding villages from trading with the Muslims for a time and constricting their economic life in general.  In August, Muslim leaders demanded government protection after at least 28 deaths and the disappearances of Muslims since the beginning of the peace process. 

The September press indicated that some Muslim youths were gravitating towards militancy, and had sought to procure arms to protect their communities.  Clearly vigilante activity in Mutur showed that the violence was more organized than it had been previously and this is troubling. But one fact stands out: from the start of the cease-fire up to May 2003, guns had only been used by Tamils. The agents who used them were members of the LTTE, either regulars or vigilantes, and they did so with LTTE backing.  The first time Muslim vigilantes used a gun against a Tamil was when Gunam Subaraj was shot on 4th August 2003 in apparent retaliation for the murder the previous day of a police officer who had served in intelligence.    Prior to that Muslim militant activity in Mutur was largely that of street fighters and market thugs responding to LTTE provocation.

Abuse of vulnerable groups in the North-East by the LTTE continues unabated. It is time for Norway and others who wish to bring peace to the island to rethink their superficial notion of peacemaking. Ignoring the democratic potential within the community, and preserving a temporary absence of war while enthroning exclusive ideological movements or ignoring systematic violations will in the end undermine the process. Experience has shown again and again that accountability for the past and present should be instilled in some way as a norm of any process to achieve lasting peace

Special Report No. 17

Rewarding Tyranny: Undermining the Democratic Potential for Peace

 I. INTRODUCTION

The LTTE has engaged in a deliberate effort over the last 21 months to advance its political and military hold on the North-East under the cover of the cease-fire, to gain access to billions in foreign assistance, and meanwhile to contain any democratic effort (local or international) that might challenge its basic totalitarian nature.  While its leaders honed their diplomatic skills, their cadres terrorised opponents and sowed communal discord. The LTTE’s audacity in disclaiming any responsibility for the killing of its political opponents in the government-controlled areas, mirrors the disingenuousness of its assurances to the Sinhalese people and the international community that it is earnest in its quest for peace.

The effects are being felt.  Violence and communal unruliness are on the rise; as are inter and intra-party political squabbles at the parliamentary level. While Tiger leaders parade around European capitals shaking hands with every dignitary the Sri Lankan government can muster, at home, on the orders of these very same leaders, their frightened, confined and often-impoverished democratic opponents and their families, (and others long out of politics) are being abducted, tortured and killed.

A peace process is generally understood to involve progressive movement towards a stable order, based on broadly agreed upon principles which promote resolution of conflicts rather than their aggravation. Assessed by these very basic tokens, the "process" in Sri Lankan was not about peace. It was an exercise in public relations, spearheaded by the Norwegian and Sri Lankan governments that intentionally ignored clear signals that the LTTE was not operating in good faith. "

The LTTE, which routinely denies placing children under arms, was forced to implicitly admit it engaged in the practice, by the fact of an agreement with UNICEF in March this year, on demobilizing child soldiers. However, the UNICEF’s sacrifice of principle in the name of realpolitik has parodied the effort to bring relief to child soldiers. Contrary to all expectations of the agreement with UNICEF, the LTTE has once again intensified its conscription programme, renewing its demand for one child per family in several eastern districts, while making aggressive intrusions upon school children in the North.

UTHR(J) has repeatedly argued that a peace process that accommodates systematic violence is a contradiction in terms. We document the LTTE’s conscription of children, its violence against Muslims and against its own people, not simply to illustrate how LTTE terror functions, but to show its devastating effect on society.  The fascist ideology practiced by the LTTE  -- one that denies independent thought, compassion and tolerance -- will never bring peace and dignity to the Tamil community or security to its neighbors; its destabilizing nature in the region must not be underestimated.

Current efforts to secure a lasting peace in Sri Lanka were doomed from the outset, because they began by denying and then downplaying obvious abuse (such as the LTTE’s blatant child conscription and systematic political assassination).  Blaming Sinhalese or Muslim “extremists”, the PA, SLMC, or the hapless Tamil groups opposed to the LTTE for its failure is convenient, but wrong.

The Government’s bankruptcy is evident in its critical, but perhaps misplaced, reliance on India and the US coming to its assistance in the event of a resumption of war, while it has singularly failed to build any meaningful consensus with the opposition on the political issues at stake. 

The Norwegian interlocutors, the Japanese, who are mustering the financial incentives, and the international community, together with the Government, have shown a dangerous ineptitude in their stark failure to hold the LTTE to international norms, which it repeatedly acknowledged. Were the LTTE’s perception of interest in a federal solution, it had at its disposal international goodwill and war wariness and a desire for peace in this country as cardinal assets. In the Guatemalan case, even a militarily weak rebel group became a key partner in the peace process through the agency of the Assembly of Civil Society.

What we have in this country is a total perversion of the peace process by the LTTE. Instead of calming the situation and allowing the country to ‘think peace’, it has steadily stepped up the warlike rhetoric. It has used the military space provided by the ceasefire to conscript children under the very noses of the Army, to launch a massive military build up and to secure strategic deployment. The course of the ‘peace process’ tells its own story very clearly: 

Paragraph 16 of the Tokyo Declaration reads: “The Conference also urges the parties to move expeditiously to a lasting and equitable political settlement. Such a settlement should be based upon respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. In this regard, the Conference looks forward to the parties reaching early agreement on a human rights declaration, as discussed at the sixth session of peace negotiations at Hakone.” But what does the Declaration really mean in practice?

On linkage between donor support and progress, Paragraph 18 includes, “Participation of a Muslim delegation as agreed in the declaration of the fourth session of peace talks in Thailand” and “Parallel progress towards a final political settlement based on the principles of the Oslo Declaration”. Both these have now been virtually ruled out by the LTTE and hardly anyone is pressing them. Also included is, “Implementation of effective measures in accordance with the UNICEF-supported Action Plan to stop underage recruitment and to facilitate the release of underage recruits and their rehabilitation and reintegration into society.” A great deal has gone wrong from here. Why the misleading euphemism of ‘underage recruitment’, when the fact of the abduction and conscription of hundreds of very young children has been confirmed by organizations including the AI, HRW, UNDP and the SLMM? We will not speculate, one need only look at the current direction of UNICEF’s work.

An important contradiction in the Interim Administration approach with sinister consequences is being overlooked. The High Security Zones issue can be resolved only through a political settlement leading to de-militarization. The interim administration having a brief for re-construction in the absence of a political settlement, will quickly lead to rancorous, irresolvable contradictions over the High Security Zones. The LTTE apparatus is well practiced in making the Government and the Sinhalese look unreasonable, even while it pushes its military stakes. At this time the LTTE has turned a traffic accident in Jaffna into a familiar ‘people’s agitation’ for the Army’s removal.

The response of the international community was reflected in the World Bank’s announcement on 16th July of a release of $1 billion over the next four years for reconstruction in Sri Lanka. The country Director Peter Harrold, while saying that the peace process was going ‘remarkably well,’ linked disbursements to further progress. He refused to be drawn into the question of human rights (V.S. Sambandan, The Hindu, 17.07.03).

The World Bank, ADB and the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) issued a statement on 2nd October after a two-day meeting. It spoke of their commitment to assist reconstruction and development in line with the Tokyo Declaration, and to fund new projects based on progress in the peace process. AFP quoted Peter Harrold on financial aid, “Merely resuming the talks between the Colombo government and Tamil Tiger rebels would not be sufficient. We want to see results emerge from the talks rather than the start of the talks."

Whenever questioned on human rights, Harrold has merely reiterated the Tokyo Declaration, but avoiding the subject otherwise, as in the 2nd October statement, even as child conscription and assassinations by the LTTE are alarmingly on the rise. As indicated above, the Tokyo Declaration’s intentions regarding human rights, democracy and an expeditious political solution have been surrendered almost casually. The idea of progress now appears to rest largely on a neo economic agenda. We argue in this report that this is an area that calls for much rethinking.

There is little doubt now as to who was calling the shots, but by this time the attention of the international community was wandering; Sri Lanka was once again treated as a marginal problem in world affairs. The events indicate that the international community’s idea of progress means, in practice, progress on the LTTE’s terms. To the UNP government, probably as it had known at the outset, the problem became one of maintaining an appearance of peace talks, with conferences here and there, in the hope of keeping the World Bank and others happy to disburse cash until the next elections. The emphasis now is not to rock the boat and to keep the money flowing. For the Norwegians and the Japanese, it has become a matter of saving face.[Top]

The Diplomatic Blitz and the Message

Along with the meeting of donors in Colombo, which the LTTE declined to attend, a well-coordinated diplomatic blitz was launched by the donor countries to persuade the LTTE to restart the peace process. All met LTTE political wing leaders in the areas they visited. The Danish ambassador visited the Vanni on 10th –11th September; the Japanese envoy Akashi, Amparai on the 13th and the Vanni on the 14th; the Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen and his Special Adviser Erik Solheim had discussions with various parties on the peace process from 17th to 19th September; the Canadian ambassador visited Killinochchi and talked to Thamilchelvan on the 19th and the SLMM Head had discussions with Thamilchelvan on the 28th.

There is no doubt that they all raised the same issues, including killings, with perhaps differing emphasis. What is more important is the impression they make on the LTTE. During the period covering this diplomatic offensive, from 7th to 28th September, there had been in the Batticaloa and Amparai Districts, a record of 6 murders by the LTTE, 3 disappearances and one injured victim in hospital (see Chapter VI below). This is not surprising.

The LTTE media represent this intense courting of its functionaries by diplomats as the international community endorsing their exclusivist ideological claims (see articles by Thuraimehanathan and Venithan in Thamil Alai, 20.09.03). They see this as a special privilege granted to them for the sacrifices of their dead, and hold it an insult for anyone else, the Muslim leaders for example, to think that they should sit with them as a party to the negotiations. Any injunctions by diplomats about killing or child conscription do not register. Why should they, if they are not seen to be seriously meant?

The EPDP complained in a letter to the Japanese ambassador (17.9.03) expressing distress over the Japanese Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi’s negative approach to meeting democratic Tamil parties. It pointed out that members of the Tamil opposition parties who were being decimated by LTTE assassins were excluded from the delegations Akashi met in the Amparai District to assess the situation, despite earlier requests to the Japanese embassy.

If one is in any doubt about the message the LTTE is getting from the West and Japan, take the following remarks made by Commander Karuna from a press interview given from Zurich during his recent European tour (Thinakkural 4th September 03):

“In support of the interests of Sinhalese communalists, some Muslim leaders [Rauf Hakeem in particular] are engaged in creating divisions between Muslims and Tamils…Therefore if communal clashes break out in the North and East, it is the people of this region who will be destroyed. Hence the Muslims must be extremely careful in this matter… When a separate police unit is raised for the protection of Muslims, it will lead to many problems. The Muslims must understand this. When an ordinary problem explodes into a clash, it is the Muslims of this region who will bear the destruction… If a special police unit is created under the present conditions, the Muslims will have to be very vigilant to prevent communal clashes. We have experienced at first hand the tragedies and losses resulting from armed struggle in the past. The Muslims too must take note of this.”

This interview came against the background of Muslim leaders demanding government protection after at least 28 deaths and disappearances of Muslims during the peace process. Much of the message is in the man saying it and his bloody record. The context would suggest to the ordinary reader the blessings of Europe and the Swiss government! This singular outcome comes against the US-led War on Terrorism.[Top]

The War on Terrorism and Sri Lanka 

Although in general the war on terrorism as led by the US has tended to politically arm ‘terrorist movements’ rather than weaken them, in our context it has some impact on restraining the LTTE from embarking on war, as they had regularly done earlier. However, it could not restrain them from terrorising the community locally and carrying out their agenda. That too because the UNP's appeasement policy, which was backed by the Norwegians, undermined even the small but significant degree of external pressure applied on the LTTE.

The Sinhalese nationalists have on their part pounced on the War on Terrorism as their only platform to deal with the LTTE. Glossing over the inherent inconsistencies of the US-led war, they have harped on its ambivalence towards the LTTE. They leave world opinion unconvinced by trying to hide what the rest of the world knows – the long and harrowing history of state terrorism against the Tamils – and shedding instead tears for the Tamil victims of LTTE terror. Reliance on the lopsided US-led war on terrorism to deal with the LTTE in the absence of any local initiative to disarm it politically is doomed to failure.

Such an initiative must seek to disarm not just the LTTE, but also all ideologically narrow, violent and anti-democratic forces that are now coming to the fore. Many of them are offspring of the same forces that marginalized the minorities, while playing up the insecurity of the Sinhalese to keep themselves in power.

Meanwhile, the peacemakers are relying on military parity as the sole rationale for peace.

They miss the point of the LTTE strategists’ reliance on this peace process as the stepping-stone to Eelam, and the manipulation of Tamil civil society under the aegis of the same.

This is in part a reflection of the impotency of Colombo-based civil society actors, who too have no strategy except to hope that the current global milieu would induce the LTTE to compromise. They have largely lost the ability to mobilize pressure from below-upwards to influence the different actors – in particular the UNP to build a constructive relationship with the opposition parties, especially with the PA, towards a real peace process that brings human rights concerns to the forefront.

Unable to do this, many have become mere fiddlers, playing to the Government’s discordant orchestration of appeasement. Their camaraderie with the UNP and the cry by the JVP and other extremist forces to eradicate the LTTE militarily are the two sides of the same coin. Both show no concern for the ordinary Tamil people, whom they both crush.  Both conspire to arm the LTTE politically, which plays on Tamil insecurity and claims to offer the only viable solution.  [Top]

What of the People?

The people are intelligent enough to be cynical about the present peace process. Their hope against hope that the LTTE may be serious this time has faded and they cling now to the hope that the current state of non-war will last just a little longer.

For members of the Tamil community, the widely publicized issue of rehabilitating child soldiers is fast being overshadowed by the whole society facing a sort of LTTE conscription. From 1986, the LTTE has tried to impress on the people that their duty is to obey “the movement” without question and in effect to be cogs in its military machine. They will be assigned roles in the Orwellian world of Eelam, as fighters, bearers of fighters, publicists, demagogues, bureaucrats, or even human rights activists who are blind to what happens within.

Once such a regime is in force, there is no need to abduct children. They are simply there, conditioned and ripe for harvesting. The LTTE has no other vision for human society. Although this ordering of society has been implicit in the LTTE’s propaganda for nearly 20 years, it has largely failed because the people had some room to manoeuvre or escape. However by increasingly atomizing society by advancing its terror, it has gone some way towards making the poorest sections bow to a fate of not being able to exercise guardianship over their own children. Protecting that right is an object of human rights activity, which this peace process is fast eroding.

When the International Community came in, the people did expect them minimally to ensure that human rights and democracy were enshrined in the process.  When Sri Lankans see the International Community more interested in keeping up appearances with the LTTE, meekly accepting the shifting of goal posts and leaving the process a shambles with mere token protest, naturally their worst fears are aroused.

The motto of the LTTE “The thirst of the Tigers is the Motherland of Thamil Eelam” is still the slogan at rallies, Pongu Thamil events and other gatherings. But recently, they are, as it were, flagging a new cry: “The thirst of the Tigers is an Interim Administration”. Many peace activists see it as proof that LTTE has changed its colours.

Those who vilified earlier calls for an interim administration by other Tamil groups, remonstrating that we need political rights and not interim solutions, are now very deliberately, even fearfully, avoiding any discussion of the core issues. Is this an inconsistency on the Tigers’ part?   No.  Any one who follows developments on the ground knows there is no inconsistency.

The process allows the LTTE to be totally unaccountable. It permits the Tamils’ “sole representatives” to continue their exercise of power through sheer violence, and to control and manipulate Tamil society. Hence the leadership’s perception of interest in this process is to achieve their “goal” which is intertwined in form and content. Eelam, that is, in form, and absolute control of its polity in content. But the concomitant political developments in the South will further aggravate the already uncertain future confronting the Tamils. Unless the Norwegians and the international community see clearly to insist on meaningful accountability, by both the LTTE and UNP, the LTTE will drag the Tamils again into massive death, waving the mirage of Eelam as their banner.

One could feel how swiftly the shadows are closing in since the murder of Subathiran less than four months ago. An incident in Jaffna illustrates where things are going.

Since the beginning of the peace process a number of Colombo-based NGOs have been going to Jaffna with foreign speakers to hold discussions and seminars in places like the University of Jaffna, on topics like, federalism, political solutions, alternative models, reconciliation and challenges of peace around the world. These efforts were well meant and provided some life and discussion in an otherwise drab environment.

Recently, four young men accosted an intellectual who had been to one such seminar. They told him, “Annai, you mustn’t go to these seminars”. The man replied, “ Why, I only sit and listen, I don’t say anything”. One of the young men shot back, “But you might speak to them afterwards in private!” This kind of intimidation is very effective against the background of political killings, which is part of their purpose. Unknown filibusterers have deliberately insulted some delegations from Colombo. Tamils in these delegations showing democratic tendencies receive special attention as suspected ‘traitors’. The LTTE routinely claims that such actions come from the ‘people’, even when the dodgy behaviour of the hosts speaks otherwise.   

One day the peacemakers will give up and leave. To defend their LTTE-centred appeasement and dismissive attitude towards other ‘disruptive’ interests, they will blame this or that ‘extremist’ group or the President.  But that would be to confuse secondary with primary phenomena. It does not take much perceptiveness to discern that the UNP government’s crudely opportunistic elevation of the LTTE was pregnant with tragedy.[Top]

              II. REWARDING MURDER AND DISINTEGRATION 

Karuna’s grand tour of Europe placed in sharp relief against the murder in broad daylight of Navaneethan (Patkunam) by his goons a few days later, in Batticaloa town, tells us what this MoU and peace process are now really about. Navaneethan had been a member of the EPRLF(V) and like many others left for reasons, including the lack of resources. Navaneethan lived with his family in Batticaloa town and worked as a mason. At the last elections he had worked for the party. The LTTE had visited his home twice before and missed him. On his way to work at 8.00 AM on 15th September, an LTTE party led by Sathyan and Mathan accosted him near the petroleum depot.

 Sathyan pulled out a knife and stabbed Navaneethan, who fought back and protested, “I am not in any movement, why do you want to kill me?” This went on for 5 to 10 minutes in public view during rush hour, Navaneethan fighting back attempts by the goons to stab him. Finally Mathan pulled out a revolver and shot him several times. Navaneethan died in hospital. This happened at the height of the diplomatic blitz by donor countries and on the day of Mr. Akashi’s press briefing in Colombo (see Chapter VII).

 The LTTE’s deliberate disregard for the terms of the MoU could not have been more public. Complaints have been made to the Police and the SLMM. The Police are ‘investigating’, but no arrests will be made. Since, as we understand, Murder is not listed specifically as a violation in the MoU (although ‘violence against civilians’ and carrying weapons in the government controlled area are forbidden), the SLMM will not investigate.

 Though the SLMM has now said publicly that political killings are violations of the cease-fire agreement, the real problem might be their utter lack of any capacity for investigation. They will ask Karuna, or one of his nominees, during their regular meetings and he would deny having anything to do with it. SLMM, Batticaloa, would then send a report to HQ, who may in turn take it up with the Police, who will continue to ‘investigate’.

 Privately, a member of the SLMM in Batticaloa has said he believes that the LTTE has been, by the course of events, given a clear message that they could get away with anything, and so have pulled out their old hit lists. The Police appear to be under orders from the top not to act on complaints against the LTTE. The member opines that this is a bad patch, and things might ease up if an Interim Administration came into effect in which the LTTE had to be accountable to the Sri Lankan Police. Giving the LTTE police powers, as they have demanded, would make things worse than they are now, he added. But the international community has already lost the game of nerves. It has no stomach for matters that may complicate the drive for appeasement.

 The resettlement of Muslims in the North whom the LTTE meanly robbed and expelled to live in miserable conditions is another issue requiring special consideration from donors. Resettlement is their right and cannot have anything to do with the LTTE’s likes and dislikes. Everywhere in the North-East the economic life of the Muslims is being deliberately squeezed and their slow displacement that is taking place in the East today may become a catastrophe in a time of war. However, to represent the Tamil people as beneficiaries in this game is the characteristic folly of Sinhalese chauvinism. Where there was malnutrition in the LTTE controlled areas, it is still there. Fear and hatred of the Muslims is being deliberately cultivated among children, who deserved far better, to force them into military service.

 No, things are going badly and it is better to be honest about it. In early August, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a joint statement of concern about political killings by the LTTE along with a detailed report by HRW. Just after this an expatriate supporter reportedly met LTTE leader Prabhakaran and Intelligence chief Pottu Amman. We understand that the latter’s casual remarks evinced no change in the LTTE’s approach to political opponents. The Japanese Special Envoy Mr. Yasushi Akashi met the LTTE leader for 3 hours on 8th May. The LTTE press statement on the meeting concentrated on the utilization of donor funds. What it did not say is contained in an instructive story in the diplomatic grapevine.

 During the meeting, Mr.Akashi made a vigorous plea dealing with democracy, human rights and the conscription of children. The LTTE leader, the story goes, heard him out impassively without a word of response, and no sooner had Akashi finished, moved to the next item on the agenda. Nevertheless, Mr. Akashi has continued unremitting in his efforts to host functions where money will be rattled and the LTTE will meet a choice of dignitaries from around the world. A month after the AI and HRW expressed concern about the LTTE’s political killings, the European Union issued a statement reflecting that concern. It did nothing to dampen the ebullience of European tours by LTTE leaders, who came back to business as usual.

 The vast majority of the people in any community are not extremists by nature. Even if they are unconvinced they are willing to give an initiative by a new government a chance. They cannot be blamed for having no confidence in what is going on now in the name of peace. This loss of confidence is evident in the deep and even violent divisions within the SLMC. The TULF is transfixed. If the JVP is emerging as a major ‘disruptive’ force, it is the peacemakers who must question themselves. The UNP’s handling of Southern opposition parties too raises questions about its seriousness in seeking the essential Southern consensus. While the President is being blamed for a ‘negative’ approach, the UNP has failed to heed repeated calls to broad base participation in the talks. The LTTE, which has spared no effort to keep things that way, is the only force with a clear grasp of what is doing. Its current strategy is clearly reflected in recent events in the East.[Top]

III. FANNING EMBERS IN THE EAST

Among the techniques used by the Sri Lankan Forces along the eastern seaboard south of Mullaitivu in the 1990s, was that of calculated provocation, by introducing Sinhalese settlers or by importing Muslim agent provocateurs from Colombo. Any real or purported response was used as a pretext for massive retaliation against the Tamil civilian population. Large masses of especially the Tamil rural population became refugees. The result of such actions is usually a fait accompli in favour of the side with the greater potential for violence. The technique is a familiar one:  Israeli Prime minister Ariel Sharon is using it today in a bid to force on the Palestinians a deal that would confine them to a small, arid fraction of what was once their home. [1]

The LTTE then, in the traumatic year of 1986, did much of the work for the Sri Lankan forces by decimating the other Tamil groups. Were it not for the Indo-Lanka Accord, the Sri Lankan forces would have succeeded. Today, however, it is the LTTE that is using the technique against the Muslims in the East. Attempts to constrict the economic life of Muslim traders in Valaichenai had begun before the incidents in Mutur in June 2002 (our Special Report No. 14). The events in Mutur culminated in massive LTTE-organised retaliation, principally against properties, business premises and crops. This was followed by Muslim protests in Valaichenai, where the LTTE killed 14 Muslims and followed it up with further constraints on their economic life.

In the East in particular, a large proportion of fields worked by Muslims were in areas where access required the cooperation of the LTTE. When SLMC leader Rauf Hakeem and other Muslim MPs met the LTTE leader in April last year, the LTTE leader agreed to all their requests to normalize the lives of Muslims. But for Muslims returning to Jaffna, it was a long journey from their refugee base to a place where their houses and schools were rubble. The required relief was not forthcoming and LTTE regulations and taxes made viable trade nigh impossible. The underlying message was, ‘You were chased away, now stay away’. These people were never party to any kind of violence. In the East many fields once worked by Muslims have become ‘disputed’, and the decision is in the hands of an LTTE local leader. These simply drag on. In April 2003 the situation in Mutur again worsened:[Top]

Mutur: April, 2003

After nightfall on 31st March 2003, two married Muslim youths Maqbool Naim (28) and Abdur Razak (28) sailed eastward in their boat towards the LTTE-controlled Tamil area of Kadatkaraichenai. According to sources from the area, they had gone at the invitation of a Tamil businessman from Sampur, as Muslim fishermen often did, to trade in dry fish, ganja or timber. The youths did not return and it was presumed by the Muslims that they had been arrested by the LTTE as confirmed to them by Tamils coming from the area. The latter said that the missing youths would be produced in LTTE courts after inquiry.

However, a very balanced report prepared by the Muslim Information Centre (MIC, 28 Apr.2003) points out that when local community leaders sought information by visiting LTTE offices, LTTE leaders acted evasively, keeping the community leaders waiting from 9.00 AM to 3.00 PM on several occasions. As frequently happens when dealing with a fascist force, the community was divided. One section felt that the youths would be released in two weeks if they did not agitate for the release. Thus when the youths were not released, they blamed the politicians and those who agitated with them. The drama was reminiscent of the disappearance in 1986 of Jaffna University student Vijitharan and the student agitation that followed.

Meanwhile, tensions between Muslims and the LTTE had been on the rise over other causes. Under the MoU, the Muslims began moving into parts of their traditional economic zone lying in areas under LTTE control and tried to reoccupy abandoned villages and take possession of properties that had contributed to their livelihood, in for example, Uppural southeast of Mutur. MIC points out that the LTTE prevented them by citing such reasons as landmines, and coincidentally or otherwise, Muslims were approached by Tamil individuals and organizations with offers to buy up their very fertile properties. There were also according to Tamil sources, the usual tensions that arise when men from a better off, property owning stratum of society have dealings in an impoverished area, which is made worse when an ethnic factor is also involved at a time of rising tension. (See the Sammanthurai killings below.)

Further, Muslims going into LTTE-controlled areas such as Sampur identified some of their possessions presumably looted during the disturbances of June 2002. A number of complaints were made to the SLMM and they sometimes even got back their goods. The Muslims attribute this to be the main reason for the LTTE imposing a prohibition on Muslims going into the Sampur area, which was in force when the two youths were abducted. M.K. Isiyathumma (48), the mother of Jabir, who had been going to the LTTE regularly inquiring for her son, committed suicide on 15th April, leading to a heightening of tensions in Mutur.

Meanwhile, Ministers Rauf Hakeem, Abdul Cader, M.H.M. Azwer and MPs M.M.Mahroof, M.M. Thowfeek and ‘Thidir’ (‘Surprise’) Thowfeek had rushed to Mutur. The LTTE, which had been silent on the subject of the missing youths for 15 days issued a statement denying responsibility and regretting the death of the mother. The LTTE accused a mysterious ‘third force’ of trying to foment division between the Muslims and Tamils.

While Rauf Hakeem complained about the helplessness of the Muslims and demanded government protection, Mahroof, who is from the UNP, said that Hakeem should resign for failing to protect the Muslims. As during the previous year, the Muslim UNP MPs were following the party line of keeping up appearances with the LTTE and not blaming it. In turn, with Hakeem getting a bad press as a troublemaker, the situation became more confused.

As for the disappearance of the two Muslim youths, Tamil villagers in the LTTE-controlled area east of Mutur are not in any doubt about the LTTE’s involvement. The stories circulated often try to attribute some reason, and one such story is that the youths belonged to the  ‘Osama Group’ or the ‘Jihad’. Other stories are variations on this theme. Another is that one of the youths was caught escaping and killed and the other was also killed to cover up the affair. A less speculative reason comes from the Muslim delegation that met the LTTE’s Trinco political leader Thilak for talks on 21st April. Without admitting anything, Thilak casually told some in the delegation to tell Muslim fishermen to keep off the Sampur-Kadatkaraichchenai area as they have facilities that are secret.

We have no doubt that the LTTE was behind the attacks on Muslims during that period. No independent group of persons would be allowed to take the initiative in such matters, and, what does not suit the LTTE, it could have stopped quickly. Besides guns were used by Tamil mobs, as seen also from photographs by journalists. The sequence can be seen to fit the pattern of provocation of Muslims, Muslim reaction and major reprisal. Apart from reports from our sources and the MIC report, we have also used reports in the TamilNet to fix the chronology.

31st March 2003: The LTTE abducted fishermen Naim and Jabir

5th April 2003: Two Muslims who were fishing in Uppural (a salty lagoon east of Thoppur) about 10.15 AM were severely attacked and badly abused by members of the LTTE for no reason. Their boat was also confiscated. Later, at noon, a group of Muslim students that was picnicking in the area was attacked by the same LTTE members (MIC report).

6th April 2003: According to the MIC, the LTTE member Kanthan who was involved in the attack on the Muslim students was identified by the victims at Thoppur and badly beaten up. S.Sujeef writing in the Sunday Virakesari (20.04.03) says that the person (‘Kanthan’) who was attacked on his way home to Pattalipuram, spotted two Muslims while passing through Pallikudiyiruppu and detained them. On hearing of this, he added, 6 Tamil youths passing through Thoppur were detained by Muslims. Finally wiser counsels prevailed and both sides released their hostages. However, Thoppur was marked.

14th April 2003: Rauf Hakeem arrived in Mutur. Jabir’s mother committed suicide the following day. LTTE publicly denied the abduction of the youths. On the 16th Rauf Hakeem and other ministers and MPs visited Thoppur.

17th April 2003: In the evening, according to TamilNet, a crowd attacked the Muslim village of Thoppur. Very significantly, as also reported by TamilNet, 4 Muslims, 3 men and a woman (Abesha Bee), were warded in Mutur Hospital with gunshot injuries, while one Muslim (Nilabdeen (50) died of gunshot wounds. Two Tamils, whose names were given by TamilNet were warded in Killiveddy Hospital with cut injuries. It was pointed out to us that the use of guns does not necessarily point to the LTTE as many civilians have home made guns for hunting. But in this particular instance, we were told by trusted Muslim sources that regular LTTE guns were used.

While Thoppur lies about 6 miles south of Mutur town, a Tamil crowd came across the river from Kattaiparichchan into the Muslim area of Vattam east of the town and burnt 15 boats belonging to Muslim fishermen near the Mutur jetty and also some houses and looted Muslim shops.

17th – 18th April 2003: Beginning the 17th night and going into the morning, angry Muslims reacting to what happened in Vattam burnt a number of houses and shops belonging to Tamils in Mutur town. In the process a Sinhalese shop and one or more Muslim shops were also burnt. About 250 Tamil families (over 1000 Tamils) sought refuge in the Roman Catholic and Methodist churches in Mutur town. By this time the Government had declared curfew in Mutur town, but the Police, especially, were not enforcing it. Policemen were seen standing by idly and watching as Tamil premises were burning.

18th April 2003: The Defence Minister Mr.Marapone and the IGP Mr.Anandarajah arrived in Trincomalee and conferred on the situation with Mr.Hakeem, Mr.Sampanthan (TULF) and other MPs and ministers at the Kattaiparichchan army camp. Meanwhile, a large Tamil crowd estimated at around 1000, from the LTTE controlled eastern side of the Kattaiparichchan Bridge armed with swords and staves, and a Muslim crowd from Palanagar on the government-controlled side, confronted each other. According to a journalist present there, the soldiers identified the LTTE men among the Tamil crowd as persons wearing checked sarongs of the same design, occasionally taunting the soldiers by showing their back. The conference was taking place against the background of this pandemonium. A grenade was thrown at the Tamil crowd which was trying to enter the Muslim side (an army grenade thrown by a Muslim as widely believed by Tamils) and shots were fired by the Army, killing two Tamils Mahesweran Ravishankar (32) and Tharmalingam Kamalathasan (25) were killed.

18th April 2003: An LTTE led crowd of hundreds came in the night and looted Azath Nagar and Hyria Nagar. There were no casualties. About 350 families were displaced.

19th – 20th April 2003: At mid-night about 10 members of the LTTE came to Jinnah Nagar and Arafat Nagar, which lie about the 58th Mile Post, 5 miles South of Mutur. They talked to the Muslims who served them tea, reassured them and left around 12.00AM. At about 1.00 AM the two agricultural settlements were raided by a crowd of 300 led by the same LTTEers, following the throwing of a petrol bomb. The Muslims began running to the nearest army camp. The attackers removed jewellery from several of the fleeing women. The raiders looted the place removing valuables, paddy and tractors. About 650 gunny bags of paddy were burnt. The raiders also polluted the wells by throwing into it products of their destruction of shops and houses.

The following gives the general pattern of destruction as conveyed by independent observers: “There was a clear pattern of destruction in the Muslim villages, where the attackers generally came from the LTTE-controlled area. The exceptions were Thoppur and 58th Mile Post, where the attackers came from the government-controlled area, and in one instance, along with some Sinhalese, after the shop of a Sinhalese man married to a Tamil woman was burnt. The geographical pattern of the destruction tells its own story, indicating very clearly who the attackers were. Close to the border virtually every Muslim house was burnt. Further into the Muslim area, the pattern changes rapidly to a mixture of houses being damaged with machetes and items burnt inside houses. This in turn was followed by physical destruction but no burning, indicating that the attackers ran out of fuel and inflammable matter.

“The attackers in Mutur town at first burnt whatever they could, and subsequently took to destroying physically after stocks of petrol were finished. Everywhere, the intention was clearly to do as much damage as possible in the shortest time.

 “Houses where doors and windows did not open easily escaped with a few machete marks on doors and windows. Valuables like, bicycles, fishing nets, boats, fridges, television sets, radios, closets with cloths, and in one instance a huge collection of books, were particularly targeted for destruction. In a number of instances the house itself was not burnt, but the things were collected together in a corner and burnt. While cooking utensils, pots and pans were systematically damaged, home gardens were usually left alone. In a number of cases, it was reported that household goods and furniture were thrown into the well.

“Among the telltale signs of direct LTTE participation in the attacks on Muslim neighbourhoods in Mutur town are the use of hand grenades in damaging several houses. Offhand, at least seven such houses were visible to the casual observer. These appear to have been chosen randomly. One may conjecture that the main purpose behind the use of grenades was to instill fear into those returning. In the Tamil areas of Mutur town, destruction was equally willful, but because it was confined to small patches, the proportion of houses burnt was much higher”.

Two more Muslims were shot dead. On Monday 21st April, Mohamed Rabsali (41) of Iqbal Nagar was shot dead, reportedly while bathing in a tank. The following day, Meera Lebbe (50), a resident of Selvanagar, was shot dead while his daughter Lafir Sashila survived with injuries, bringing the number of Muslims killed to five.[Top]

LTTE Statements on the events

On the 16th April, the LTTE political secretary for Trincomalee issued a statement denying their role in the abduction of the two missing youths and blamed a third force that was against the peace process (TamilNet). At a meeting with TULF MPs in Killinochchi, on 19th April LTTE political leader Thamilchelvam said, “We are constantly striving to strengthen unity with the Muslim people. In spite of this incidents have taken place. Some [Hakeem?] are making mountains out of molehills and are creating violence” (Virakesari 2.04.03).

On the same day Seralathan, an LTTE dignitary, at an Annai Poopathy memorial meeting in Batticaloa, took exception to Rauf Hakeem’s request for more army personnel to protect the Muslims. He warned the Muslims that they must not forget that they are part of the Tamil Eelam nation whose flag will fly at the UN one day. Their economic resources are among the Tamils, he said. Should political forces drag the Muslims towards seeking illusory protection from the Sinhalese state and political forces, he added, they would have to face enormous losses and huge tragedies (Virakesari 21.04.03).

A statement by the LTTE’s political wing in Trincomalee (Thinakaran, Sunday 20.04.03) said that in spite of their informing the public through leaflets and the media that they had nothing to do with the disappearance of the two Muslim youths, a group [Hakeem’s SLMC?] seeking to make political capital out of this has created tension between the Tamil and Muslim communities. It said, “Consequently, Tamils have been attacked and their belongings were destroyed. The Muslim people have prevented the movement of goods and foodstuffs into areas controlled by us. On 18-04-03 while the security conference was taking place, Tamil people demonstrated outside the Kattaiparichchan army camp, demanding that the road going east be opened. A grenade was thrown and gunshots were fired resulting in two being killed and 14 injured. We vehemently condemn this attack that took place within close proximity of the ministers and security top brass, leading to a state of shock among the Tamil people. We call upon the people to beware of these forces that create disunity between the Tamil and Muslim peoples and to expose them.”

At a meeting arranged by SLMM in Trincomalee the following day (21st), LTTE’s Thilak and Moulavi Kareem of the Mutur Mosque signed an agreement committing themselves to rebuild trust between the communities, and to jointly call for impartial law enforcement by the security forces in areas under their control, while the LTTE guaranteed the security of Muslims in areas controlled by them. On the 22nd, LTTE’s Trinco military leader Colonel Paduman issued a statement condemning the attack on a group of Muslims in Allai Nagar, near Thoppur, denying the LTTE’s involvement and blamed it on forces against peace. This was the day an allegedly mysterious party shot and beheaded Meera Lebbe.

The rhetoric, propaganda and actions of the LTTE, with regard to the Muslims, are similar to those of the authors of the July 1983 violence against the Tamils and the counter-insurgency that followed. Deplorably similar are also the combination of patronizing appeals and threats to the Muslims, with the insistence that, like it not, there is only one nation that dictates their identity and terms of domicile.[Top]

May-July, 2003: Continuing Provocation and a New Trend

One factor stands out in the violence involving Muslims under the MoU up to May 2003. Guns had been used exclusively by the Tamil side, and, without belabouring the point, we assert that the agents who used the guns, home-made (of which we have no specific instance) or otherwise, were members of the LTTE, either regulars or vigilantes, and did so with the LTTE’s backing. In discussing the violence in Mutur and Valaichenai in June 2002, we found no evidence of there being a politically motivated, organized and armed Muslim extremist group called the ‘Osama Group’ as claimed by Tamil politicians and the media. We argued that the floating of such group was an attempt to muffle the highly disproportionate violence suffered by the Muslims. As against 14 Muslims killed, one Tamil was killed, and that by police firing in Valaichenai during June 2002.

There are Muslim religious zealots, market thugs and younger educated Muslims who talk about doing more to defend the Muslims in a time of crisis. It is natural for them to come together when the community is under threat. Whether they call themselves Osama, Jihad or whatever the name one may wish to give them, there is no evidence that they were an organized force up to April 2003 and every indication is that they were marginal in Muslim society. But the deliberate deprivation and humiliation inflicted on Mulsims by the LTTE, as the Tamils should well understand, was bound to drive these marginal elements to the fore, eventually.

Take the continuing direction of these incidents. In Mutur town itself the destruction in the Tamil area is prominent and most Tamils have left except a remnant that takes refuge in the two churches when there is trouble. But for the Muslims the losses are crippling. For a community involved in trade, fishing and agriculture, many businessmen have closed shop and moved out. Fishermen have become highly restricted. In each Muslim settlement attacked by LTTE mobs, people have abandoned the fringes and so-called border areas. More and more fields have been abandoned because it is not safe to go there. Muslims have been beaten, killed or warned off places that had been their traditional zones of economic activity for generations.

After every crisis the Government is quick to announce that more army patrols have been ordered for the protection of Muslims, life is fast returning to normal and peace is progressing on track. UN and international agencies refuse to look deeper and risk rocking the peace boat. In reality things are going irretrievably wrong. Take the beating up of Muslims who went to Uppural. It was not a newsworthy event in Colombo. The Police and the SLMM would have, if complained to, treated it as a fairly pedestrian assault by unknown persons. The LTTE itself, to whom a complaint was made, denied having anything to do with it and told the Muslims to punish the culprits if they found them. But the Muslims in the area, who have a nagging dread of what the LTTE is up to, know for sure that were they to go there again, it would be to risk, even marginally, the fate that overtook Naim and Jabir.

After the violence, the LTTE turned the screws on the Muslims further by banning Tamils in Mutur and the surrounding villages from trading with Muslims. It was also in effect harassment of the Tamils who had to go far to buy their requirements from Sinhalese traders in Dehiwatte. Tamil farmers who normally sold their produce in Mutur, also suffered unbearable losses. The lengths to which the LTTE went were petty and humiliating to the Tamils as well as Muslims. Tamils coming from Trincomalee by ferry and going to a Muslim shop for a cup of tea or to purchase something, found themselves confronted by Tamil vigilantes telling them that they should not go to a Muslim shop. Persons carrying packets of biscuits were asked at LTTE checkpoints where the goods were bought. If they declared the goods to have been bought at a Muslim shop, they were confiscated!!!

These are not ordinary communal riots after which things can settle down to normal. There is a force with a clear agenda now courted beseechingly by the international community and against which the Government has gone into a state of voluntary paralysis. In July the LTTE’s new camp at Kurangupanjan among the rice fields chiefly of Muslims in Kinniya became a heated issue, but not because a number of Muslims were losing their livelihood. Such things are too much part of a pattern to be stray incidents.

In Batticaloa the LTTE claims that 5000 acres of paddy fields belonging to the Muslims have been given back and another 35 000 will be given back in due course. But for the Muslims in practice, something happens, like the two farmers killed near Sammanthurai, and they are afraid to go. Grazing land for Muslim cattle herders is now limited. A herder Mustapha, of Mosque Road, Oddaimavady, left 107 cows for the night at Navalady Junction in Valaichenai on 18th September. LTTE men under the local military leader Sivam, rustled the cows and took them to their farms in Kudumbimalai

The desperation and anger felt by Muslims in Mutur expressed itself in a way that is not unexpected. A few of them decided to obtain weapons. It appears that the LTTE came to know of this because the Tamil agents from whom the weapons were sought had tipped them off. Sources in Mutur believe, and it is plausible from the events, that both the LTTE and the Muslim vigilantes prepared hit lists, based on persons who were most active on the other side. The Muslims were being further drawn into a trap.[Top]

The Incidents of August 2003

3rd August 2003, Sunday: Noorthamby Rilwan, a police officer who had served in intelligence was under interdiction and was residing at his home in Jinnanagar, 59th Mile Post, Mutur. He was shot dead by the LTTE in the morning while cycling to his restaurant.

4th August 2003: At 2.30 AM Gunam Subaraj (21), a mason married with one child was shot dead through the window of his house. The Tamils are clear that the killing was by Muslim elements in reply to Rilwan’s murder. According to local sources Subaraj’s father had been awake and saw the killers parking a bicycle in front of their house.  How close Subaraj was to the LTTE is in dispute, but it appears to be generally known that he was active during the incidents. Subaraj’s killing was the first time Muslims had used a gun.

13th August 2003: Two Muslims, Abdul Kuthus Fareed (35) and Mohamed Riyaz (27), were shot dead in Chelvanayakapuram, a northern suburb of Trincomalee, about 8.00 PM, while they were riding a motorcycle. One, if not both, of them is, according to local sources, an employee of the Ports Authority. Press reports quoting the Police said that they had negotiated the purchase of a weapon with a Tamil agent and paid Rs. 20,000 in advance. On the fatal day they had reportedly gone with the balance of Rs. 80 000 while the LTTE, who had set up the agent, was waiting for them. Press reports (e.g. Daily News 18.08.03) said that both the money and the motorcycle were stolen. The Police could not have got this information other than from someone in the know.

According to Muslim and Tamil sources from the area, Fareed, an SLMC supporter was known to take a significant part in violent agitations, while Riyaz was regarded fairly decent.

13th August 2003: Tamil sources said that Muslim shops in Mutur that remain open till late closed early on that day indicating something unusual. But Adrian Selvan who belonged to a Tamil family living in Mutur had not known about this. He left home about 10.00 PM and went a short distance from home to confirm arrangements with a van they had booked to go to the Madhu festival. Adrian never returned. His case will be discussed in detail below.

As people became aware of the tension, the Tamils, as before, went to the two churches as refugees. The mood among the Tamils was that earlier it was their properties that were at risk, but now there was no guarantee for their life. At mid-day on the 15th at Palathoppur 4 Tamils stabbed E. Jiffy of Azath Nagar who was cycling through. He was hospitalized with injuries.

On the 16th morning the LTTE abducted two Muslim fishermen at sea. They were Mohamed Rafik (46) and his son Rafik Firoz (15). Tensions rose steeply as a large crowd of Muslims stoned a passenger bus. The police used tear gas and batons to disperse the crowd. Five passengers and four policemen were injured according to the Daily News.

Muslim elements too reportedly kidnapped a Tamil teacher and student. All four abducted persons were subsequently released. Rafik and Firoz complained of beating.[Top]

Change of Scene: Amparai, August 2003

17th August 2003, Sunday: The scene suddenly shifted to the Amaparai District. About 7.30 PM, two cultivators in Sammanthurai, A. Ibralebbe (40), a father of four, and K.L. Ismail (21), a father of one, told those at home to prepare food and went on a motorcycle to Nelluchenaivattai to check things in their field. They went 3 miles along the Amparai Road, turned into the bund road going to their field. Labourers keeping watch in their wadis heard the sound of a T-56 automatic gun, but for fear did not come out to check.

The bodies of the two men were recovered the following morning. Nothing was stolen. Had instinctive suspicions about the incident led to communal violence, the natural target for Muslim vigilantes in Sammanthurai would have been the Tamil suburb of Veeramuani.

However, the mosque authorities in Sammanthurai were determined to prevent an outburst. They, to their credit, acted quickly, summoned the people, urged restraint and brought the situation under control. As to the main incident itself, confusion was rife. Among the Muslims themselves there was reluctance to blame the LTTE for two reasons. One, they would have been accused of throwing spanners into the peace works. Two, in an effort to resolve their parochial concerns, they were talking to the LTTE – at least talking – and this went a long way towards clinching the point for many: That it is not in the LTTE’s interest to kill Muslims at this time, when it has to impress on the international community its capacity for responsible behaviour.

The theories proposed to explain the killing of the farmers centered on groups with a motive for sabotaging the peace process: Some Tamil group opposed to the LTTE or a Muslim group opposed to the SLMC, particularly some extremist group. We rule out both possibilities. The LTTE has under the MoU terrorized and gunned down all Tamils who might pose the slightest hindrance to its hegemony. The others live in camps under police protection. In our judgment the choice was between some group in the security forces and the LTTE and we can largely rule out the former. 

Such devious action has hardly ever been known to originate from individuals. It needs a very ruthless and calculating terrorist organization that has developed the capacity over many years along with routines to preserve secrecy. The latter involves brutal punishment for any breach of secrecy, and for dissent. Concomitant with this would necessarily have been a series of internal killings and general fear. The only organization that fits the bill is the LTTE.

The Muslim community has a long way to go to reach that state .Its politics remains contentious and open. No one party has succeeded in edging the others out. There is political violence, but far form being secretive; it is in the nature of open gang warfare. The kind of terrorist culture required for devious killing, preserving absolute secrecy by enforcing fear on the wider community, and complex logistics, does not exist in the Muslim community at present.[Top]

Context Of Conscription

What in our judgment was the most important context behind the incident has not even been reported. Contrary to all expectations and the deal signed with the UNICEF, the LTTE has once again intensified its conscription programme. Reports of conscription in significant numbers in the area came from Karaitivu, Veeramunai, Akkaraipattu, Thambiluvil and Vinayagapuram since mid-August. The LTTE’s renewed insistence was one child per family. 

Veeramunai, the sizeable Tamil village closest to the scene of the two murders above was visited by the LTTE on 15th August. It forcibly took away 14 youths. Karaitivu and Mandur are quite close and several Tamil villages lie in Sammanthurai West AGA Division. Resistance though passive was intense and people were hiding their children or sending them out. The Muslims were killed two days after the LTTE visited Veeramunai (which is incidentally under government control!) and it came back to Veeramunai a week later on the 24th and took away at least 5 persons. A Muslim backlash was useful and contriving one was not out of character with the LTTE’s record.

True, if one sees the LTTE’s principal need as succeeding in the peace process, killing these Muslims and all its manoeuvres in Mutur are utterly irrational. But movements governed by immoral ideologies have irrational compulsions. Was it rational for the UNP government, which wanted the open economy to succeed, to foment the July 1983 communal violence? We will return to the incident below.

18th August 2003: On the day following the killing of Ibralebbe and Ismail of Sammanthurai, Ibrahim Ilyas (30) and Thambilebbe Marzook (20) from Malihaikkadu, Sainthamaruthu, left for Valaichenai, telling their families that they would come back the next day. When they did not return, local youths organized a hartal (stoppage) and agitation.  Malihaikkadu is situated next to Karaitivu towards Kalmunai, barely a mile across the paddy field from the edge of Sammanthurai. Malihaikkadu, which has a long history of simmering tensions with Karaitivu, has also one for acquired militancy. It is well known that during the IPKF period in the late 1980s, the LTTE found shelter largely in Muslim villages and Malhaikkadu was one of them. From Malihaikkadu, according to local sources, the LTTE used to creep into Karaitivu, carry out assassinations and get back to cover. In mid-1989 there was a massive attack on Malihaikkadu by Tamils in Karaitivu supported by militants opposed to the LTTE, and backed by the Indian Army, after which the assassinations stopped (see our Report No. 3 of 1989). During the LTTE’s presence, youths in Malihaikkadu became familiar with weapons.

In response to the Muslim agitation, the Government sent a special police team to conduct investigations. By tracing records of the numbers dialled on a cell phone belonging to the missing persons, the Police remanded M.A. Fowzie and M.B. Hussein from Oddamavady, Valaichenai, north of Batticaloa, whom the missing persons had gone to meet. While earlier reports said that the missing had gone to buy a trishaw, police sources, according to TamilNet (25.08.03), said that the disappeared youths had purchased a T-56 automatic rifle from the persons remanded.

The Police were evidently working on the theory that Fowzie and Hussein had abducted, killed, or knew the fate of, the missing persons. Oddamavady is a relatively small, crowded area and had anything happened inside, the Police could have easily found out. There is little prospect of any Muslims taking a corpse for disposal outside Oddamavady without the security forces or the LTTE finding out. About ten days after the event, we heard form a community leader who had spoken to SSP Sheriffdeen, then on special duty in Kalmunai, that the search for the fate of the missing persons in the Muslim quarter had drawn a blank. The media too lost interest in the issue of the suspects whose first remand date expired on 8th September.

We now come to the report in the Thamil Alai and Paadumeen.com of 22nd August that ties up the LTTE’s fatal and inevitable conjunction of activities – the attacks on Muslims and Tamil opposition groups and the conscription of children and adults.[Top]

 “The Varathar Group (EPRLF(V)) Sells Weapons to Muslim Gangs in the Eastern Province”

“Certain gangs operating behind the cover of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) are getting prepared to attack Tamils according to information received. To this end they are purchasing huge quantities of weapons. It is learnt that the two Muslims killed in Trincomalee [on 13th Aug.] had gone to see a person from the EPRLF(V) to negotiate sales of arms that are being purveyed by this group at a discount.

“It is reported that the two killed were leaders of gangs, which attacked Tamils in Mutur. The Police are investigating why early after nightfall the two went to Uppuveli beach with Rs. 80 000 in their possession, and how the money went missing…

“A special CID team, it is reported, is probing whether there is a connection between these killings and the subsequent killing of two Muslims [at Sammanthurai]. A Colombo paper has pointed out that the killed Muslim youths [all four of them] were agents of persons having close contacts with Rauf Hakeen and the SLMC.

“When the Indian Army was in Sri Lanka, large quantities of arms were given to the EPRLF. They were hidden in several locations in the North-East. The Sri Lankan government too gave them weapons. The weapons hidden in the East are now being sold to Muslim gangs at reduced rates.

“It is to attack Tamils that Muslim gangs are buying these weapons. To this end these gangs have received huge funds. Amparai District SLMC MP Anwar Ismail spoke recently of a plan to wage war against the Tamils. MP Mrs. Ferial Ashraf too announced recently that Muslim youths will bear arms and wage war against the Tamils.”

‘Thamil Alai’ is the paper started by the LTTE in Kokkadichcholai after it forcibly shutdown the ‘independent’ paper ‘Thinnakathir’ published in Batticaloa town that was already toeing its line, and robbing its equipment wholesale. The piece above has been cleverly crafted using a mixture of half-truths, distortions and lies. Mrs. Ashraf never spoke of waging war against the Tamils. All that she said was the obvious, that as the Government has failed to protect the Muslims, it should come as no surprise if the Muslim youth take up arms to protect the community (the Island 20 Aug 03). A bit rhetorical perhaps, but nothing fundamentally wrong.

Rhetorical, because during the ceasefire the LTTE has killed or abducted many more Tamils than Muslims. The LTTE has also abducted thousands of Tamil children. As certain incidents in Mutur show (see Buried links…below), there is so much pressure on the Police by Muslim politicians calling for the protection of Muslims, that the Police have done nothing to protect innocent Tamils from Muslim vigilantes with party connections. As the result they play into the hands of LTTE propaganda and its campaign to have the Sri Lankan Police removed from the North-East. We have no illusions about the LTTE’s intentions towards the Muslims, but for that very reason Muslim political leaders have to be more sensitive to the intricacy of issues.[Top]

The Sammanthurai Murders

We note that while many observers are hesitant to blame the LTTE for the killing of the two Muslim farmers in Sammanthurai and are weighing many alternative theories, the Thamil Alai article quoted makes no attempt to hide the LTTE’s involvement. We now return to the incident that has defied simple explanation.

Having contacted a number of sources, we think we have an answer that is close to the truth. Nelluchchenaivattai, where the two farmers had their fields, borders the Tamil villages of Mallikaitivu and Valatthapiddy. There are also Muslims living close to the border. One of those killed (hereafter referred to as the deceased), was reportedly a strong supporter of the SLMC, who also had at least one Tamil mistress in Mallikaitivu. (The village suffered badly at the hands of the Sri Lankan forces during 1990 leaving many women widowed, see our Special Report No.3.)

‘Kottan’ Mahendran is a member of the LTTE from Vihara Rd., Kalmunai, whose beat long covered the area concerned and was once involved in tax collection from Muslims. He is also reputed to have robbed 3 or 4 motorcycles from Muslim farmers. Mahendran also got married in Mallikaitivu. Mahendran had, we understand, warned the deceased a number of times over three or four months not to come into Mallikaitivu. But the deceased had reportedly been defiant, and had told people that Mahendran was threatening to kill him.

Mahendran and Mangaiyan, a native of Thirukkovil in LTTE intelligence whose beat covered also Thirukkovil and Akkaraipattu, were regularly seen moving along the bund road by Muslim farmers. They often carried weapons like T-56s and grenades. On the day in question, the two had stopped at a wayside kiosk for a cup of tea after nightfall, not long before the murder. The incident occurred near a culvert not far from the kiosk. According to stories in circulation, the deceased had hit out at Mahendran after they were stopped.

This version of the incident makes at least obliquely some connection with the Thamil Alai article above. The killings of Muslims given above were not random or arbitrary. There was a vague shadow of a cause from the LTTE’s unacceptable and utterly hypocritical standpoint. The strategy in the Sammanthurai affair, for one, was not in the murder itself, but in the timing. If the Thamil Alai article is any indication, it was not Mahendran who determined the timing. There was an organizational hierarchy making careful calculations. [Top]

The LTTE’s Obsession with the EPRLF(V)

The LTTE did not express its fierce obsession with the EPRLF(V) aloud until very recently. Since the ceasefire came into force the LTTE has been targeting members of the EPRLF(V)very much on the sly. When it killed the EPRLF(V) Mandur local council chairman Alahathurai last December, it tried to conceal its action by choosing a stormy night, but failed. As soon as the LTTE saw that the people were hostile, it claimed the victim to be a supporter of theirs. Subathiran (Robert) challenged the LTTE politically as an active member of the Jaffna Municipal Council. He moved about in Jaffna, the LTTE never said a word against him and in open encounters treated him with respect. What distinguished Subathiran, as an observer in Jaffna put it, was that he was a ‘cultured’ challenge to fascism. The LTTE killed him surreptitiously in mid-June this year.

We quote from an appreciation for Subathiran in the Daily News (21.06.03), which for the record we give in full as Appendix IV: “I got to know Robert as a caring man, an idealist. He went out of his way to help and showed how much heart he had. My assessment of his character proved correct when he rose to the needs of the times and demonstrated his mettle working closely with the TNA in running the Jaffna Municipal Council within a refreshingly democratic framework and serving the Tamil public in many ways”

Not even the LTTE’s ardent armchair middleclass supporters dared to say a word against him. Why suddenly weave those fantasies in the article above, about a hunted group leading a hand-to-mouth existence, and whose supporters and former members are literally starving because they cannot live and work in their village for fear of their life? One reason is that this group was seen as the LTTE’s main political challenge on the horizon. Another reason was suggested in oblique justification by the LTTE’s mouthpieces in the Tamil Press (e.g. Subathra in the Sunday Virakesari, 22.6.03; also similar allegations in Uthayan). This was to the effect, citing some expressions of concern over the killing in India, that Subathiran was key to India’s master plan for intervention in Sri Lanka. The LTTE’s paranoia about India is also reflected in recent abductions of former ENDLF cadres in Batticaloa.

Interestingly, in the piece above the LTTE has not named the putative EPRLF(V) person in Trincomalee to whom the two Muslims went to buy a weapon. Were it so, that would have been something for the LTTE to go to town on. While the Police have given journalists details like the deceased having Rs 80,000, which went missing, they have been strangely silent about how they came by that information and whom they went to meet. While Rauf Hakeem acknowledged that the deceased were his supporters by attending their funeral, he has evidently not pushed for a full police investigation and the arrest of the killers and their accomplices. This contrasts with Rauf Hakeem’s insistence on firm police action against violent supporters of party dissident, Minister Athaullah.

We thus gain some insight into the weaknesses of the Rauf Hakeen’s TULF-style ethnocentric politics and how the LTTE is drawing him on, along with his Muslim rivals, into a trap. The crux of the article above is that the Muslims must be attacked because they and their leaders are waging war on the Tamils, the EPRLF(V) must be attacked because they are traitors selling arms to Muslims to attack Tamils and, the Tamils must tolerate some irregularities so that the Tigers can raise an army to defend the Tamils! We move on to examine Tamil security in the Mutur area and explore how it fits into the overall scheme of things.[Top]

The LTTE, the State and Tamil Insecurity in Mutur

Where the peace process was concerned, everything was going in favour of the LTTE. It was in effect treated as the only force in the North-East that counted. Not just the TNA MPs, even Muslim MPs went on a pilgrimage for a dharisanam or audience with the LTTE leader in April 2002. He even graciously patted Rauf Hakeen on the back as the Thalaivar (Leader) of the North-Easten Muslims. Far from opposing the LTTE, the Muslims wanted a deal to live and let live. However, the LTTE’s intolerance of pluralism eroded the initial show of pragmatism within two months, as happened in 1990. The Tamils in Mutur town became in turn the sacrificial victims of its agenda. Their plight was also useful propaganda for the LTTE. Where its machinations were concerned, the ineptitude of the State and the shortsightedness of the SLMC played into its hands. The President and the PA too showed their lack of grasp of reality in identifying the North-East merger as the main problem, simply to make a populist gesture.

Buried Links in the Disappearance of Adrian Selvan

Adrian Selvan disappeared on the night of Wednesday 13th August, shortly after the murder of Fareed and Riyaz in Trincomalee (see above). Selvan went out about 10.00 PM to confirm the booking of the van taking them to the Madhu festival and never returned. We understand that his father Mr. Selvan complained to a police officer patrolling the streets that same night, and at the Police Station the following day. The Police did not do a serious search. They walked along streets but did not enter any suspect houses.

The Muslims too were rather upset by what had happened, since Adrian whom they called a ‘very good boy’, moved freely among them. One of his three sisters was married to a Muslim. The Muslims too were feeling the onset of internal terror at an incipient stage. They secretly passed on messages to Adrian’s family. On Saturday morning the Roman Catholic priest received a call from a Muslim who was deeply upset, informing him that Adrian was killed and thrown into the lagoon where the Mahaveli River terminates. A group of Tamils immediately sought police help in recovering the body. The police party came only late in the afternoon with a party of soldiers. It was late when they got to the bank and there was not much time. The Police stood by idly while the Army helped the searchers, but the body could not be found. The Tamils in Mutur as a rule have no confidence in the Police, but have some trust in the Army.

On Monday (18th) Mr.Selvan received an anonymous letter saying that Adrian was dead and they could perform the funeral rites. This was done. There were two different versions of how Adrian was killed. One, that he was taken into a house and knifed, and that a Muslim woman who later saw the blood stains fainted. The other, that his screams were heard from the lagoon side.

A number of Muslims secretly passed on the identities of the killers. We received three names and have been told by responsible persons in the area that they have been cross-referenced by a plurality of sources. Our sources also stated that two of the three persons named are on the payroll of the Sri Lanka Ports Authority, which comes under Rauf Hakeem’s ministry. A number of his supporters are according to these sources on SLPA’s payroll, while in fact some do only party work, as was the case with one of the three named. It is also notable that the two Muslims killed in Trincomalee are SLMC supporters and one at least was on SLPA’s payroll.

We were also told that the Police in Mutur have the same information about the identities of the killers, but did nothing about it. Soon after the murder of Fareed and Riyaz, Rauf Hakeem waxed indignant on the insecurity of Muslims, but did not press for a thorough investigation. Similarly Tamil nationalists waxed indignant about Adrian Selvan’s murder, but as to the killers being brought to justice, there was an eerie silence on their part. Everyone found impunity useful, some for more intelligent reasons than others.

While the resentment of ordinary people like Adrian Selvan’s family is nurtured through a system of justice that leaves them out in the cold, the TULF’s legal expertise works full time to ensure that the LTTE receives right royal treatment from the Sri Lankan system of justice. The Police arrested the LTTE’s Pudur area leader Subaraj Devanayagam (Satyaraj) on 6th June 2003, acting on eyewitness testimony that implicated him in the murder of Navasooriyan of Army Intelligence in a Batticaloa saloon, on 19th May. Four days later, the LTTE abducted two policemen. On 4th July, TULF candidate and lawyer K. Sivapalan urged bail for Subaraj at the High Court in Trincomalee on the grounds that Subaraj had an alibi. Judge Paramarajah granted Subaraj Rs. 10 000 cash bail with the caution that he should not interfere with the investigation! Two days later the LTTE released the abducted policemen. The curtain closed on the charade.

Against this one finds it almost sinister that not one TULF lawyer, MP or politician in Trincomalee challenged Rauf Hakeem to sign a joint statement demanding an impartial inquiry into Adrian’s murder, or demand aloud that the Police should do a professional job and justice must be seen to be done. Instead, when Tamil and Muslim representatives get together they jointly utter empty platitudes declaring that Tamils and Muslims are brothers who must continue their centuries-long fraternal coexistence, and then do little to make that a reality. This is seen in the fate of the agreement initialled on 21st April by the LTTE’s Thilak and Moulavi Kareem. Adrian’s family’s, which is typical of hundreds of families in the area, illustrates the desperation felt by ordinary Tamils.

The Withered Tree – the Demise of a Family

Mr. Selvan who worked for the Co-op in Alankerni, adjoining Kinniya, lost his job in 1982 over an allegation that he was responsible for a fire in the premises and was unemployed for 13 years, during which time he had moved to Mutur. He was reinstated in 1996 and works for the Co-op in Mutur. He had 3 girls and 4 boys. The story of the loss of all his four boys embodies several of the tragedies that overtook rural Tamils in the region, affecting hundreds of families:

Jesuntreepan Selvan (born about 1969): When the war recommenced in 1990, Mutur became unsafe and many Tamils moved as refugees to Pachchanoor. On 25th August 1990, the Army came to Pachchanoor and took away 20 youths, including Jesuntreepan. All of them disappeared. We do know that most of them were taken to Plantain Point army camp in Trincomalee, where hundreds were tortured and killed. Almost no one came back (our Report No.10 gives a testimony of conditions inside). The matter came up before the North-East Disappearance Commission set up by President Kumaratunge (Official Report – 1998). The Commission made a strong adverse comment on the testimony of the officer in charge, who reported the loss of records. The officer in time became a major general.

Presley Stephen Selvan (born 1973): Joined the LTTE and died in action in Thampalakamam on 10th July 1990.

John Stewart Selvan (born 1974): Arrested on suspicion of belonging to the LTTE, was held in Kalutura and was released, but had to appear for his case in Colombo according to local sources. He died falling from the train on 7th March 2000 while travelling between Trincomalee and Colombo.

Adrian Selvan (born 1982): Killed by Muslim vigilantes on 13th August 2003.

The insecurity felt by Tamils in the region became particularly intense during the UNP government of 1977 – 94 and has continued ever since (our Reports No 10, 12, Bulletin No.10 and Sp. Rep No 8.). If it needs a graphic illustration, we quote from the survey done by a government agency, the Poverty Impact Monitoring Unit, in the Trincomalee District (the Sunday Observer 19.3.2000). According to the agency, children in the North-East are likely to be suffering from high levels of severe malnutrition and stunted growth.  In the Trincomalee District 51% of children were underweight compared with the national average of 31%. In the same district, stunting was highest among Tamils (34% in government-controlled and 42% in LTTE-controlled areas), followed by 17% among Muslims and 15% among Sinhalese. Wasting among Tamils was 27% in randomly selected villages in the government–controlled areas and 38% in the LTTE-controlled areas. Corresponding figures for Sinhalese and Muslims were 25% and 14% respectively. Acute malnutrition among children in the District was 26% compared with the national average of 13%.

There is a chequered history in which the parties in government have behaved very badly over the years. Thus when the PA links the insecurity of Muslims, which is indeed grave, to the North-East merger, as though it (the PA) has a proud record of making the Tamils feel secure, it plays into the hands of the single dreaded actor, who today occupies the centre stage.

The New Vanniars 

In the village of Uppural, hidden away in the LTTE-controlled area to the east of the district, the people are thin and withered in appearance. No proper government services or rations reach them. Its one dilapidated school building was only recently repaired by the GTZ. In desperation the people go into the jungle to look for roots to feed themselves. There are other villages like Veeranagar where the situation is not so bad, but these worst cases illustrate a general tendency in the area.

What these people needed most was for someone to prod the government machinery that already exists, and ensure that these people get minimally the health, education and welfare services that it is obliged to provide, and to canvas humanitarian agencies to supplement these efforts. In the normal course of things, even the imperfect working of a parliamentary democracy should provide this measure of stabilisation.  This was not in the LTTE;s interests.

The LTTE did not choose its targets idly, but deliberately removed interlocutors who could advocate effectively for and between their communities.  It assassinated two MPs from the region, A.L.A. Majeed of Kinniya (SLFP) in 1988 and A. Thangathurai of Killiveddy (TULF) in 1997. The two kept the social peace between Tamils and Muslims and developed the area. While in 1985 the Muslim UNP MPs had to toe the line and lend complicity to the plan of destabilizing the East by indiscriminate attacks on Tamil villages, Majeed stood alone, warning Muslims of the plan and the role of some UNP Muslim MPs (who eagerly embrace the Tigers today) and told them not to become pawns of these machinations. Where the UNP government failed in creating a permanent rift between the Tamils and Muslims of the area, the LTTE appears to be succeeding astoundingly well. Thangathurai was killed amidst his untiring efforts at getting the war-devastated area rehabilitated.

What the Tamil people of the area need most is better health, education, nutrition and better opportunities in life. What they needed least was to be starved, fed with hate and turned on the Muslims as mindless, marauding mobs. As for bringing the Tamil people to their knees, the LTTE appears determined to bring to fruition what a malignant government started in 1985.

The state of the Tamil people in the LTTE-controlled part of Mutur’s hinterland today is strangely reminiscent of the conditions suffered by their forebears 200 years ago, when a combination of colonial incursions and a decline of the authority of the King of Kandy, gave licence to wide ranging abuses by native chieftains (Vanniars), whose harsh rule and imposition of compulsory, unpaid labour to maximize immediate profits, forced inhabitants into grinding deprivation or flight. As the new Vanniars, the LTTE is busy imposing the bondage of military service on the Tamil population, using Muslims as the pretext. Those who hope that the LTTE would see the rational need to establish Muslim-Tamil amity, hope in vain.[Top]

Children and the New Bondage: the LTTE’s Compulsory Military Training

Once the LTTE set Mutur on fire last April, rumours began to fly and people started getting worked up. The LTTE pretended to be aloof, while carefully pouring oil on the flames from behind. What happened in Jinnah Nagar and Arafat Nagar made the LTTE’s stratagems very clear to the Muslims, but it may not have been so obvious to the Tamils. According to Tamil sources, a number of Tamils asked the LTTE for help or at least for arms and grenades, but outwardly the LTTE made out that it was not getting involved. But as soon as the troubles were receding, the LTTE demanded that everyone living under its control must undergo compulsory military training as auxiliaries. The ages of persons called up ranged from 13 to 70.

Details about the auxiliaries, the Maravar Padai, vary from source to source. All males in the LTTE-controlled area surrounding Mutur, and school children from about the age of 13, were trained in armed combat. Every village is said to have a leader who takes part in decision-making and maintains the LTTE’s authority. The core of the auxiliary force is believed to comprise several thousands. Our sources said that in all schools teachers, under instructions from the LTTE, were compelling children from Grade 7 (Year 8) upwards to undergo military training. Among the 14 or so sizeable schools in the area is Sampur High School. The number of children in Years 8 & 9 is estimated at above 2000.

Although most of these children live at home, they have been issued with parts of the uniform such as caps and are regular